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Investors' Paradox
Anita K. Krug*
For the first time in an era, new investment products for smaller ("retail ") investors
are emerging. These products are mutual funds that engage in the types of trading and
investment activities that have long been the province of sophisticated investors.
Accordingly, the new funds (called "alternative funds") promise to reduce the gulf between
retail investors and their sophisticated counterparts, in terms of portfolio diversification
and investment results. This Article describes the complex mix of factors that spawned
alternative funds and critically evaluates the funds' potential, the first scholarly work to
do so. It additionally unearths the paradox that impedes the realization of that potential:
although financial advisers counsel that portfolio diversification reduces investment risk,
taking advantage of the opportunities that now make diversification possible could unduly
increase that risk. This result, moreover, arises not from alternative funds themselves.
Rather, it is a product of the fact that the primary regulatory toolfor protecting investors-
disclosure-is particularly ineffective in the alternative fund context. In addition, the
profit-driven financial professionals that assist retail investors with their investment
decisions need not, in many cases, do so in furtherance of their customers' best interests
and, in any event, may not have sufficient expertise about alternative funds to be useful.
The Article contends that regulatory solutions should center not on disclosure, as the usual
target of securities regulatory reform, but, rather, on the processes by which mutual fund
shares are marketed and sold to investors. It proposes politically feasible reforms that
would dissolve the paradox, enabling retail investors to take better advantage of the new
investment universe.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the realm of commerce, goods and services that are "private" are often expensive
or exclusive, while those that are "public" are often available to all and affordable.
Although the divide between public and private reflects an income and wealth divide within
the populace, it is the expected effect of the workings of capitalist society. Nonetheless, in
many respects it is deeply troublesome. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the gulf
between those who have the most and those who have the least is that its very existence
serves to widen it. As an obvious example, attending private schools often produces
opportunities-whether in the form of mentors, job prospects, or other useful
connections-that bolster one's ability to collect additional resources at a markedly faster
rate, as compared with those without similar opportunities.I
In the financial markets, the division between public and private-more specifically,
between public ("retail") investors and private ("sophisticated") investors 2-is no
different, in that it signals more than simply a division of investment opportunities based
on investors' relative resources. Rather, it signals also a dynamic in which those with
relatively more resources are able to further increase those resources, as well as their lead
over their less well-to-do counterparts. Put another way, the very distinction between
investor groups widens the gap that separates them, demonstrating that, in fact, the rich do
get richer, while the poor get poorer.
Yet the investment status of the "excluded many" has begun to change, thanks to the
creation of new investment products designed to meet the needs of retail investors. The
1. See, e.g., Gerri Peev, Best jobs still go to public school pupils as privately-educated workers are 7%
more likely to get high-flying positions, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 20, 2013, 7:48 PM),
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2469742/Pivate-school-students-likely-land-jobs-state-school-pupils-
identical-degree.html (citing research showing that "[t]hree years after graduation, those from more advantaged
socio-economic backgrounds and those who attended private schools are more likely to be in top jobs").
2. Generally speaking, an investor is deemed sophisticated if she "is deemed to have sufficient investing
experience and knowledge to weigh the risks and merits of an investment opportunity." Sophisticated Investor,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sophisticatedinvestor.asp (last visited Nov. 2,2017). Under
the securities laws, sophisticated investors are those that meet specified income, net worth, or investment assets
tests, based on a notion that investors' financial resources may serve as a proxy for their level of investment
sophistication. Investors who are not deemed sophisticated under these tests are considered to be retail investors.
3. See Noah Smith, The Rich Are Different. They're Better Investors, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2015, 7:00
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-25/the-rich-are-different-they-re-better-investors-
(discussing reasons why sophisticated investors accumulate capital at a faster rate than retail investors do).
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products emerging most recently are in the form of mutual funds-that is, entities that
"pool" many investors' capital, deploying it on the investors' behalf by investing or
otherwise transacting4 in securities and other financial instruments.5 Mutual funds are
permitted to offer and sell their shares to retail investors because they are regulated in much
the same way that Microsoft, Amazon, and other public companies are regulated.
One new product is the "liquid alternative fund," which is a mutual fund6 that pursues
investment and trading strategies that are similar in many respects to the types of strategies
pursued by hedge funds,7 private equity funds, and other types of privately-offered funds.8
Because these strategies involve financial instruments beyond publicly-traded securities,
they are widely known as "alternative" strategies. And because the primary statute
regulating mutual funds-the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "Investment
Company Act") 9-requires all mutual funds to accept investor redemptions on a daily basis
and to pay the proceeds of any redemption almost immediately, the securities and other
instruments that liquid alternative funds hold in their portfolios must be readily sellable,
giving rise to the "liquid" component of their moniker.
Liquid alternative funds give retail investors exposure to investments and trading
4. By purchasing a security, one might be said to have "invested" in the security, in that the person has
"put money to use," in hopes of realizing a profit when she sells the security. Invest, DICTONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ invest?s=t (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (defining "invest" as "put[ting]
(money) to use, by purchase or expenditure, in something offering potential profitable returns, as interest, income,
or appreciation in value"). By contrast, in acquiring a short position in a security or a position in a derivative
instrument, whether it be a swap, a stock option, or a commodity futures contract, one has "traded" or
"transacted" that is, entered into a contract or other arrangement whereby the person may receive a payout when
she exercises her rights under the arrangement or otherwise terminates it. She has not, however, invested in
anything. Moreover, just as transacting in derivatives and "shorting" securities cannot be considered "investing,"
derivative contracts and short positions cannot be considered "investments." Rather, they are simply instruments.
See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
5. See Mutual Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mutualfund.asp (last visited
Nov. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Definition] (defining "mutual fund" as "[an investment vehicle made up
of a pool of [funds] collected from many investors for the purpose of investing in securities such as stocks, bonds,
money market instruments and [similar] assets"). Mutual funds are not, however, the only type of investment
companies registered under the Investment Company Act and, therefore, available to retail investors. Others
include unit investment trusts, real estate investment trusts, and exchange-traded funds. See JOHN L. TEALL,
FINANCIAL TRADING AND INVESTING 68-69 (2013) (discussing registered investment companies).
6. More specifically, a liquid alternative fund is an "open-end" mutual fund-that is, a mutual fund that
does not limit the amount of shares that it will sell to investors and that permits investors to redeem their shares
whenever they decide to do so. See Open-End Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/open-
endfund.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (defining "open-end fund" as a fund that "does not have restrictions on
the amount of shares the fund can issue" and the shares of which are purchased and redeemed "on demand"). In
this Article, "mutual fund" means "open-end mutual fund," unless the context otherwise indicates.
7. Because hedge funds' investment and trading objectives often contemplate that the funds will hold
positions in financial instruments other than securities, such as derivatives, their "investment strategies" are more
appropriately called "investment and trading" strategies, see supra note 4 (noting that holding derivative and short
positions does not involve "investing"). However, for the sake of brevity, this Article uses the term "investment
strategies."
8. See infra Part III.A (describing liquid alternative funds and their development).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2012).
10. "Exposure" to a particular financial instrument refers to one's having an investment or trading position
in the instrument and, more specifically, the monetary value that the person could potentially lose as a result of
the position. See Financial Exposure, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-
exposure.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (defining "financial exposure" as "the amount that can be lost in an
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positions that previously had been available only to sophisticated investors, through their
investments in private funds." Accordingly, a liquid alternative fund may buy and sell
public securities, as most traditional mutual funds do. But it might also transact in
commodity futures, swaps, options, or other types of derivatives; engage in investment and
trading activities using borrowed funds; and sell securities "short,"I as many hedge funds
do. 13
A second new product is a subset of liquid alternative funds but serves dramatically
to expand alternative investment options. It is the multi-manager series trust-or, more
accurately, it is the group of mutual funds within a multi-manager series trust. 14 Multi-
manager series trusts are the offspring of changes in the private fund industry that recently
have led investment advisers] 5 that manage private funds to move into the retail investment
arena. The costs associated with organizing, or "sponsoring," a mutual fund have often
been prohibitive for these firms, given that many of them are smaller and less well-
established than the investment advisers that seemingly dominate the mutual fund industry,
such as Janus, Fidelity, and Vanguard.16 The series trust solves the cost problem by
supplanting the traditional model, in which the investment adviser to the mutual fund (the
fund's "manager") sponsors the funds that it manages, with one in which a third party
serves as the sponsor.
Because the third party, rather than the fund manager, is responsible for creating each
fund, registering it under the securities laws, and handling many other organizational
matters, it also bears many related expenses that, for most mutual funds, the manager-as-
sponsor would bear. In addition, because multiple managers are able to participate in a
series trust, with each managing a separate fund-each fund being a separate "series"
within the larger trustl7the managers are able to realize certain efficiencies that would
investment").
11. See Jason Zweig, Do You See Yourself as a Sophisticated Investor?, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (July
18, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/18/do-you-see-yourself-as-a-sophisticated-
investor/ (noting that only sophisticated investors may participate in private offerings).
12. Short positions are an expression of a "pessimistic" outlook for the securities market as a whole or for
a particular company, in that a short position increases in value as the market or a company's stock declines in
value. See Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of American and British Hedge
Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 347, 358 (2008) (describing the process of selling securities short).
13. It is possible for them to do so because, although the Investment Company Act's requirements are
inconsistent with certain types of alternative strategies, the statute nonetheless permits mutual funds to invest in
illiquid securities or transact in financial instruments other than securities. See infra notes 94-102 and
accompanying text.
14. See infra Part 11.B (describing multi-manager series trusts and their development).
15. "Investment adviser," as used both in this article and in the U.S. securities regulatory regime, refers not
to an individual but, rather, to an entity-one that typically is regulated as such by the SEC or by relevant state
regulatory authorities.
16. See 100 Largest Investment Advisory Firms, CREDIO, http://investment-
advisors.credio.com/saved-search/Largest-Investment-Advisory-Firms (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) [hereinafter
Largest Investment Advisers] (listing the largest U.S. investment advisers based on assets under management).
17. Each series of a series trust is effectively a separate (limited-liability) corporation within the trust, one
that has its own shareholders and assets and is responsible only for its own debts and liabilities and not the debts
and liabilities of any other series. See Eric A. Mazie & J. Weston Peterson, Delaware Series Trusts-Separate
but Not Equal, INv. LAW. 3 (Feb. 2009), http://www.rlf.com/files/CorpTrust0l.pdf (observing that most series
trust statutes, including Delaware's, "either provide series with many of the characteristics of separate legal
entities or expressly provide that they should be considered separate legal entities"); Sue Asci, Series Trusts Gain
[Vol. 43:2248
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not be present if each instead managed a stand-alone mutual fund. Most important, because
series trusts introduce a wide range of private fund managers, as well as the alternative
strategies they developed while managing private funds, to the mutual fund market, they
constitute an important new locus of investment opportunities for retail investors.
Nevertheless, despite the risk mitigation opportunities and increased portfolio
diversification that liquid alternative funds, series trusts, and other emerging retail
investment products (together, "alternative funds") promise to retail investors, that promise
cannot, without more, be realized. Because of the complexity of their portfolio investments
and trading activities, alternative funds render investor knowledge more critical than it has
ever been. Yet, perhaps more than ever before, knowledge remains the province of
sophisticated investors. 18
As an initial matter, for most retail investors, disclosure is largely ineffective, given
both its length and complexity and human nature. That is particularly so in the alternative
fund context because alternative funds' more complex portfolio activities logically
necessitate additional pages and greater detail. In addition, any given "bundle" of
disclosure pertains only to a single fund and does not address the role that an investment
in that fund might play in furthering an investor's diversification needs.
These difficulties are punctuated by the mutual fund distribution process, by which
shares of mutual funds, including alternative funds, are sold to retail investors. This
process, which occurs through so-called distribution channels, has not been successful in
filling the yawning gaps in investors' understanding of the investment options available to
them or otherwise in countering the disclosure-related deficiencies noted above. However,
it has been very successful at keeping the mutual fund ship afloat.20 Indeed, the distribution
process has steadily funneled investors into alternative funds, thereby creating the worst of
all worlds. At the same time that investors lack a complete understanding of alternative
funds' activities, purposes, diversification functions, and unique and substantial risks, too-
effective mutual fund distribution machinery increasingly leads investors to hand over their
capital to these funds. 21
Given these concerns, the laudable promise of alternative funds seems more like a
threat. And that is investors' paradox: the standard refrain from both securities regulators
and financial advisers is that, to minimize investment risk, investors should diversify their
portfolios by investing in a broad array of asset classes.22 At the same time, the new
Popularity With Funds, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 24, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080324/REG/438853815/series-trusts-gain-popularity-with-funds
("A series trust is a single registered group comprising multiple, separate portfolios, each with its own assets and
shareholders.").
18. See infra notes 142-48 and 196-200 (discussing the ways in which sophisticated investors remain
advantaged in the investment process).
19. See infra notes 128-34 (discussing reasons why disclosure fails to achieve regulatory goals).
20. See infra Part IV.B (describing the various processes through which mutual fund shares are marketed
and sold to investors).
21. Meanwhile, because sophisticated investors do not experience the same informational difficulties, they
are not similarly hindered in their investment activities. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (describing
how sophisticated investors are situated differently from retail investors in the fund distribution process).
22. The notion is that, in a diversified portfolio, if some asset classes experience wide-scale losses, others
will remain steady or experience offsetting gains, thereby lessening the impact of the losses on the portfolio as a
whole. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (describing the importance of portfolio diversification).
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opportunities that now make such diversification possible are hampered by circumstances
that may unduly increase investment risk.
Although the academic literature is replete with analyses of investor protection
concerns in the mutual fund context, it has neither directed significant attention to
alternative funds nor recognized the seemingly intractable conundrum created by the
combination of diversification opportunities and the risks those opportunities may create
for investors. Perhaps more astonishingly, to date, no other scholarly article has even
mentioned the series trust structure and its relevance for retail investors.
This Article addresses these gaps. It argues that, although retail investors increasingly
have access to the same types of investment products that sophisticated investors do,
structural factors prevent investors from using those products to their best advantage-and,
indeed, they may inflict considerable harm on themselves to the extent they attempt to do
so. As a result, despite the hope for retail investors that alternative funds bring, the
investment arena continues to advantage the fortunate few to the detriment of the many.
In order for investors to realize the potential of alternative funds, they need to become
better informed. Toward that end, this Article contends that the disconnect between an
ineffective, disclosure-centered regulatory regime and an all-too-effective, profit-centered
distribution regime must be eliminated. Instead of allowing distribution processes to
exacerbate the deficiencies of regulatory disclosure processes, those processes should be
made to counter disclosure deficiencies and "fill in" where disclosure falls short. In other
words, the disclosure and distribution processes should work together, furthering the same
objective.
This Article proposes that those who sell mutual fund shares to investors be required
to provide their services with a view to investors' best interests and to have expertise, or at
least knowledge, about all types of mutual funds-those with alternative strategies and
those that are more traditional. In light of special distribution concerns affecting retirement
plan participants, it additionally proposes that regulatory impediments to the provision of
investment advice to plan participants be dismantled and that plan sponsors be encouraged
to ensure that participants have the benefit of advisory assistance. Of course, no solution
can be perfect, but the approaches that this Article offers would make significant strides
toward placing retail investors on the same footing as sophisticated investors.
Part II of this Article discusses the ways in which regulation incentivizes mutual funds
to invest in public, liquid securities and prevents retail investors from enjoying the same
investment opportunities as those available to sophisticated investors. It also details how
the traditional way that mutual funds are structured has fortified the division between retail
and sophisticated investors. Part III turns to a potential new dawn of investing for retail
investors, describing groundbreaking developments in retail investment options-namely,
the emergence of liquid alternative funds and series trusts. Part IV delves into the ways in
which pertinent information is disclosed to investors and the mechanisms by which mutual
funds are offered to investors-and how the disclosure and distribution processes combine
for a one-two punch that hinders retail investors' ability to use alternative funds to their
best advantage. First describing regulators' ill-considered responses to alternative funds,
Part V sets forth proposals for alleviating the difficulties associated with these funds in a
way that would effectively equip investors to select particular mutual funds based not only
on the merits of the funds themselves, but also on the diversification role that the funds
might play in their portfolios.
[Vol. 43:2250
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II. UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
Retail investors constitute an investor class that not only is separate from the
sophisticated-investor class but that also is subordinate to it. This stratification is a product
of two factors: regulation and operational structure. First, whereas applicable regulation
allows sophisticated investors free reign to invest in almost any type of security and to
transact in almost any other type of financial instrument, that same regulation often blocks
or deters retail investors from doing so. Second, mutual funds' typical operational structure
has circumscribed the pool of investment advisers managing mutual funds and, therefore,
the types of investment strategies that mutual funds offer. Together, these factors limit the
diversity of retail investment options. This Part discusses each of them in turn.
A. Regulation of Mutual Funds
Mutual funds are a well-established-if not the dominant-part of the investment
terrain for retail investors. As of the end of 2014, approximately 24% of U.S. households'
financial assets were invested in mutual funds and other registered investment
companies.23 In addition, U.S. households with investment retirement accounts ("IRAs")
or participating in employer-sponsored defined-contribution retirement plans, such as
401(k) plans, held a substantial portion of those assets-approximately half in 2014-in
mutual funds. 24
Indeed, mutual funds are perhaps the only realistic investment option for most retail
investors.25 Sophisticated investors, on the other hand, have substantially more options
from which to choose. That discrepancy is traceable to the principle, embodied in the U.S.
securities regulatory regime, that, because most investors do not have substantial
experience in financial matters, they require more protection than their more sophisticated
counterparts. Mutual funds are o en to all investors precisely because they are subject to
extensive, protective regulation. They are, moreover, one of the few investment products,
23. This figure includes household assets held through defined-contribution retirement plans, variable
annuities, and investment retirement accounts. See Investment Company Factbook, 55 INv. CO. INST. II fig. 1.3
(2015), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf [hereinafter Investment Company Factbook] (showing the
growth of household financial assets held in investment companies).
24. See id. at 12. Defined-contribution retirement plans include, in addition to 401(k) plans, "403(b) plans,
457 plans, Keoghs, and other DC plans without 401(k) features." See id. at 141 (defining defined-contribution
retirement plans).
25. See Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An
Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 605, 610 (2014) ("Mutual funds are the dominant
investment vehicle for retail investors.").
26. See Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, Hedge Fund Forum Shopping, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 783,
791 (2008) ("Due to their accessibility to the general public or retail investors, mutual funds are subject to rather
strict legal and regulatory oversight.").
2018] 251
The Journal of Corporation Law
apart from direct investment in public companies,27 that allow such broad participation.28
By contrast, many types of investment products, including hedge funds and private equity
funds, are available only to sophisticated investors because they are subject to substantially
less regulation. 29
The disparate regulatory posture toward investment products available to the few
versus those available to the many has meant that mutual funds and private funds have
differed in another important way, beyond their relative exclusivity: in their portfolio
activities, hedge funds and private equity funds do many different things. By contrast,
mutual funds have typically done just one.
To be sure, the thousands of mutual funds in the United States alone have great
diversity in investment approaches, in that different funds focus on different types or
categories of securities. Some funds invest entirely in securities issued by companies in
particular parts of the world 30-the U.S. or Japan, for example-while others invest only
in the securities of companies meeting certain size criteria, in terms of their market
capitalization. 31 In addition, some funds are value-oriented, concentrating on investments
in the securities of companies with good prospects but that the stock market undervalues, 32
while others are growth-oriented, investing in the securities of companies with strong
appreciation prospects. 3 3 Still other funds invest predominantly in securities that generate
income-namely debt securities, such as corporate and government bonds. 34
However, almost universally, mutual funds have invested only in securities, whether
of the debt kind or the equity kind. 35 Furthermore, they have invested primarily in those
securities that are traded in liquid markets-that is, securities for which market prices are
readily available and that can be sold at virtually any time for a price approximating the
27. Although public companies are, like mutual funds, subject to substantial regulation and therefore are
likewise open to retail investors, in light of the risks associated with investing in them directly, financial experts
often regard mutual funds as a better option for retail investors. See, e.g., Stocks or mutual funds: Where should
you invest?, REDIFF BUS. (May 22, 2015, 3:31 AM), http://www.rediff.com/money/report/perfin-stocks-or-
mutual-funds-where-should-you-invest/20150522.htm (highlighting risks associated with direct investing and
noting that, "for an average investor, mutual funds are certainly a better bet" than investing directly in public
companies).
28. Cf Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745,
796 (2013) (noting that the private securities market has become "inefficiently large" and that, as a result, there
are "too few investment opportunities as retail investors are crowded out from a market that is reserved principally
for 'sophisticated' investors").
29. See The Differences Between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds, INv. CO. INST. (Apr. 2007),
https://www.ici.org/files/faqs.hedge (observing that "[h]edge funds are private investment pools subject to far
less regulatory oversight" than mutual funds are).
30. See Adam Hayes, Mutual Funds: Different Types ofFunds, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/mutualfunds/mutualfunds1 .asp (last visited Nov. 2 2017) [hereinafter
Different Types of Funds] (describing different types of mutual fund investment strategies, including strategies
targeting particular world regions).
31. See Mark Whistler, Which Market Cap Suits You?, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/06/mfmarketcaps.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (describing
the strategies of so-called large-, mid-, and small-capitalization mutual funds).
32. See Different Types of Funds, supra note 30 (describing so-called "income" and "value" funds).
33. See id. (describing the objectives of "growth" funds).
34. See id. (noting that some mutual funds invest "primarily in government and corporate debt").
35. See Mutual Fund Definition, supra note 5 (defining "mutual fund" as an entity that pools investors'
money "for the purpose of investing in securities").
[Vol. 43:2252
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price reflected in the relevant fund's records at the time of sale.36 Put another way, mutual
funds' investment portfolios have traditionally contained public securities, to the exclusion
of other types of securities and non-security financial instruments, such as swaps and
37futures.
By contrast, private funds invest and trade in an array of financial instruments (dubbed
"alternative" instruments), such as put and call options, commodity futures, and swaps-
itself a category that comprises total return swaps, interest rate swaps, credit default swaps,
and currency forward contracts.38 Private funds may also buy large stakes in private
companies,3 participate in private offerings of securities by public companies (so-called
PIPES offerings), 40 and even lend money to third parties, profiting from the associated
interest payment obligations. 4 1 To be sure, private funds also invest in public securities.
However, those securities may or may not trade in completely liquid markets,42 and they
may include securities of companies in "distress"-that is, on the verge of bankruptcy or
experiencing other financial difficulties. 43 Additionally, private funds may sell securities
short, based on a prediction that the securities will decline in value, rather than appreciate. 44
Simply put, private funds enjoy broad regulatory allowance to include almost any type of
financial asset in their portfolios.
The diversity of strategies that private funds offer has been their primary attraction
for sophisticated investors.4 5 Indeed, today's sharply bifurcated investment universe
36. See Liquid Asset, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidasset.asp (last visited
Nov. 2, 2017) (defining "liquid asset" as "[a]n asset that can be converted into cash quickly, with minimal impact
to the price received" in the open market).
37. See Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, 3 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 264 (2009) ("[T]he portfolio valuation requirements imposed by the 1940 Act and
SEC rules implicitly compel mutual funds (especially open-end funds) to invest primarily in publicly-traded
securities.") (emphasis in original).
38. See Alternative Investment, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alternative-investment.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017)
(defining "alternative investment" as "[a]n asset that is not one of the three conventional investment types, such
as stocks, bonds and cash" and observing that "[a]ltemative investments include private equity, hedge funds,
managed futures, real estate, commodities and derivatives contracts").
39. See BENOiT LELEUX ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY 4.0: REINVENTING VALUE CREATION 27 (2015) ("Private
equity and venture capital funds hold large stakes in [private] companies .... ).
40. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation-Why Bother?, 2 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. 277, 339 (2007) ("Hedge funds and other private equity also supplied $27.7 billion in financing to public
companies in 2006 through private investments in public equity (PIPES).").
41. See Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/16/business/I6hedge.html (describing how hedge funds increasingly act as
lenders and noting certain regulatory concerns arising from these funds' lending activities).
42. See OFFICE OF INV'R EDUC. AND ADVOCACY, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2013),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib-hedgefunds.pdf ("Hedge funds may invest in highly illiquid securities that
may be difficult to value.").
43. See JOHN L. MAGNIN ET AL., MANAGING INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS: A DYNAMIC PROCESS 568-69 (3d.
ed. 2007) ("With the explosive growth in hedge funds ... and an abundant supply of troubled companies, by the
2000s, distressed securities investing had become well established as a set of skill-based strategies.").
44. See Short Selling Tutorial, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/ (last
visited Nov. 2, 2017) (explaining the concept of short selling and noting that "[hiedge funds are among the most
active short sellers").
45. See Stanford GSB Staff, Using Hedge Funds as Alternative Investment Vehicles, INSIGHTS BY STAN.
BuS. (Nov. 1, 2001), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/using-hedge-funds-altemative-investment-vehicles
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developed as hedge funds and private equity funds became more popular in the past few
decades, with ever more investment advisers launching their own funds and ever more
sophisticated investors clamoring after them.46 Sophisticated investors could readily
diversify their holdings by investing in private funds47 -as well as by pursuing investments
and transactions directly, outside of the intermediating structure of an entity that pools
investors 48-whereas retail investors could not. This was, and remains, an alarming
discrepancy, given that experts routinely recommend that investors allocate ten to thirty
percent (or more) of their portfolios to alternative strategies.49
Nevertheless, the regulation to which mutual funds are subject under the Investment
Company Act requires this result. In particular, mutual funds, unlike private funds, must
allow daily redemptions, 50 meaning that, on a daily basis, they must allow their investors
to return their shares to the fund in exchange for cash equal to the market value of the
securities at that time. 5 1 That requirement has two important implications.
First, it means that mutual funds must be able to determine, on a daily basis, the value
of the assets they hold, based on the current market prices of those assets. If, for any reason,
market values for particular securities in a fund's portfolio are not available-which could
be the case if, for example, the securities did not trade in liquid markets-then determining
the fund's net asset value, though not impossible, may become both difficult and, more
importantly, unreliable.52 Typically, valuation of the troublesome securities relies on best
(observing that hedge funds have substantial flexibility in their investment strategies and that they are "attractive
to investors" for that reason).
46. See LOUIS P. CROSIER, SELLING YOUR BUSINESS: THE TRANSITION FROM ENTREPRENEUR TO
INVESTOR 247 (2004) (noting that hedge funds "emerged fully into the mainstream" in the 1990s, "due to the
very public successes of global macro hedge fund managers like George Soros and Julian Robertson").
47. See Frangois-Serge Lhabitant & Michelle De Piante Vicin, Diversijication in Funds ofHedge Funds:
To Benejit, or Not to Benefit, in HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND RETURNS 3, 4 (Greg N.
Gregorieu, et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the diversification benefits of hedge funds).
48. Perhaps because of the risks associated with investing and trading directly in portfolio instruments, as
opposed to investing in mutual funds, hedge funds, and other pooled investment entities, sophisticated investors
are more likely than retail investors to do so. Cf Marcsin Kacperczyk et al., Investor Sophistication and Capital
Income Inequality 4 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20246, 2014),
www.nber.org/papers/w20246.pdf ("[S]ophisticated investors are more likely [than retail investors] to invest in
and learn about more volatile assets . . . ."). Sophisticated investors also place assets in so-called separately-
managed accounts, which are custodial accounts that an investor arranges to have managed by her preferred
investment adviser and according to her specific wishes. See Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment
Adviser Regulation, and the Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 26 n. 113 (2011) (noting that some
investment advisers manage assets for their high-net-worth and institutional clients through non-pooled, separate
account arrangements).
49. See Michael Coop, Alternative Investments: How Much is Enough?, MORNINGSTARADVISOR (Apr. 4,
2012), http://www.momingstar.com/advisor/t/54130916/altemative-investments-how-much-is-enough.htm
(observing that an investor's allocation of ten percent of her portfolio to alternative products is the "bare
minimum" for achieving diversification goals and that a twenty percent or even thirty percent allocation is more
appropriate).
50. See Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) - A Guide for Investors, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (noting that all mutual funds will
redeem investors' shares "on any business day" and must remit payment "within seven days").
51. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(a) (2016) ("No registered investment company issuing any redeemable
security . . . shall sell, redeem, or repurchase any such security except at a price based on the current net asset
value of such security.").
52. See Illiquid, INVESTINGANSWERS (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.investinganswers.com/
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estimates, usually provided by the fund's manager and possibly also by one or more
brokerage firms familiar with the securities. Regardless of how informed or reasonable an
estimate may be, however, the price assigned to the securities will remain but an estimate
that may or may not be accurate. 53 To the extent that inaccurate prices are used to calculate
a fund's net asset value, an investor that redeems her shares at that time may receive an
amount of redemption proceeds that is greater or less than the amount she should have
received.
Second, the requirement that mutual funds be able to redeem shares daily means also
that funds must be able to sell any or all of their portfolio assets at any time in order to pay
the redemption proceeds. 54 However, completing any necessary sales may be all but
impossible for a fund that holds illiquid securities: the fund not only may not be able to
accurately value those securities and therefore may not be able to determine a reasonable
sale price, it also may not be able to find a buyer. 55 Indeed, saying that a security cannot
be accurately valued is, for all practical purposes, the same as saying that the security
cannot be sold, at least not at a price that reflects its value.56 Conversely, the availability
of an accurate price for a security Aenerally implies that there exists someone who is willing
to pay that price for the security.
Given these considerations, one might conclude that, at least historically, the
investment universe for retail investors has been both vast and constrained. It has been vast
in the sense that there are thousands of mutual funds worldwide, offering thousands of
investment strategies. However, as suggested above, it has been constrained in the sense
that mutual funds' ever-proliferating strategies have been almost universally centered on
public securities.5 8 The retail investment universe, therefore, has been substantially less
robust than the investment arena available to sophisticated investors.
financial-dictionary/investing/illiquid-2235 (observing that, "[b]ecause [illiquid] assets change hands
infrequently, it is difficult for investors to agree on fair market value").
53. See GINA VEGA & MIRANDA S. LAM, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: CONCEPTS AND CASES 293 (2016)
(observing that "the output of any valuation model is only an estimate, regardless of the number of input variables
and equations").
54. See Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Liquidity, INV. Co. INST. (Feb. 2017),
https://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/mfs/ci.faqsmf liquidity.print (noting that mutual "[flunds carefully manage their
cash levels and holdings in other liquid investments to balance the need to meet both unanticipated redemption
demands" and that "funds' high levels of liquid investments mean that they can readily sell portfolio holdings to
further enhance or maintain liquidity").
55. See David Thorpe, Why Illiquid Assets Aren't All Bad, WHAT INV. (July 23, 2013),
http://www.whatinvestment.co.uk/why-illiquid-assets-arent-all-bad-2387348/ ("Almost by definition, it's usually
most difficult to find a buyer for an illiquid asset at the very time most people want to sell it.").
56. Cf Azam Ahmed, For Sale: Illiquid Assets, Hard to Value, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 28 2011,
3:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/for-sale-illiquid-assets-hard-to-value/ (noting that the
difficult part of selling illiquid assets is "matching the expectation of the buyer and the seller") .
57. Cf Miranda Marquit, Investing Basics: Why Liquidity Matters, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 3, 2012, 8:36 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-
investor/2012/12/03/investing-basics-why-liquidity-matters (observing that actively traded stocks can be readily
sold "because there is almost always another investor willing to buy" them).
58. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (providing examples of common mutual fund investment
strategies).
2018] 255
The Journal of Corporation Law
B. Operational Structure ofMutual Funds
For decades, the way that mutual funds have come into being and operated has
fortified the exclusion of retail investors from the range of investments available to
sophisticated investors. Understanding why this is so begins with the fact that mutual funds
are designed to be available to all investors, whether sophisticated or not. 59 That aspect
means that they are heavily regulated, as the previous section describes. It also means that
sponsoring a mutual fund-from forming it to managing its ongoing operations-is
expensive.60 After all, the more regulation there is governing an activity, the more
expensive doing that activity will be. 61
As an initial matter, a significant task in starting a mutual fund is to complete the same
procedures that other types of public companies-think Facebook, Monsanto, or Sony-
must complete to offer their securities to the public.62 Like those other public companies,
a mutual fund must register its securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act"),63 which, in turn, requires that it compile a lengthy and detailed registration statement
that the relevant regulatory agency-namely, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC")-must review and approve.64 Although the mutual fund is formally responsible
for bearing the costs of these activities, the person who initiated them (that is, the sponsor)
will, in most cases, pay for them, at least initially.65 Even after the fund has issued shares
to investors and has begun operations, however, it may have only a small amount of assets
for months or more. In that event, the sponsor may decline to be reimbursed for its
expenditures, even on an amortized schedule. 66 After all, if the fund were to pay those
expenses, its net asset value could be substantially impacted and, more importantly, so
could its investment return-and, along with it, the fund's ability to attract additional
capital.
The ongoing operation of the fund may generate other considerable expenses for the
sponsor-expenses that, in contrast to organizational expenses, are not appropriately borne
59. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (noting that mutual funds are one of the few investment
products that are open to retail investors).
60. See John Waggoner, What Impels Someone to Start a Stock Mutual Fund Today?, USA TODAY:
MONEY (Feb. 8, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/story/2012-02-08/new-
stock-mutal-funds-managers/53014508/1 ("It can easily cost $100,000 for federal, state and other filings to
register the fund and make it legal to sell shares to the public.") (citing the Investment Company Institute).
61. See William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a
Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 119 (1995) (observing that "regulation is an expensive
way of accomplishing goals").
62. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that mutual funds are public "in
the sense that they have issued securities that may be sold to the public and are required to make periodic reports
to their investors"), rev'd, 134 U.S. 1158 (2014).
63. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012).
64. See David E. Riggs et al., Securities Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Banker's Primer, 113 BANKING
L.J. 864, 875 (1996) ("Every mutual fund is required to file with the SEC a registration statement . . . .").
65. Its doing so is a practical necessity because, at the time the fund is organized, the fund has no investors
and, therefore, no assets with which to pay expenses. Cf Treatment of Organization and Offering Costs For New
Open-End Funds, BBD (Apr. 15, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.bbdcpa.com/investment-company-
notebook/treatment-of-organization-and-offering-costs-for-new-open-end-funds/ ("In the process of establishing
a new [mutual fund], . . . organization costs will be bome so that the entity is legally able to operate.").
66. See id. (suggesting that a mutual fund sponsor may "intend[] to incur the organization and/or offering
costs of the new fund, without the ability to recover them").
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by the fund.6 7 These include costs associated with the sponsor's hiring new personnel to
handle all of the administrative and operational aspects associated with the fund's
activities.68 They also include costs associated with marketing-called "distribution" in
the mutual fund industry-including employing dedicated marketing personnel and paying
brokerage firms to include the fund in their distribution networks.69 Costs may additionally
arise from the sponsor's becoming subject to additional, and significant, regulatory
requirements as a result of its relationship to the fund.70
Finally, if the manager is the sponsor, costs arise from the sponsor's agreement with
the fund that, each period, the sponsor will bear the fund's operating expenses-that is,
operating expenses otherwise appropriately borne by the fund-beyond a certain cap.71
These expenses consist primarily of compensation payable to the fund's many service
providers,72 fees charged by the members of its board of directors or trustees,73 and costs
associated with periodic board and investor meetings.
The considerable expenses arising from a mutual fund's organization and operation
have beget the practical imperative that sponsors start not one fund but many, each with its
own investment and trading objectives.74 Although starting multiple funds means
generating additional absolute costs, the more funds (and strategies) there are under a
sponsor's "umbrella," the less expensive each fund should be on average. 75 Thus arises the
67. Organizational expenses are typically deemed "fund expenses" because they are directly necessary for
the fund's operation.
68. Cf Henry Bregstein et al., Katten Discusses SEC's Focus on Liquid Alternative Funds Market, CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 4, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/08/04/katten-discusses-secs-focus-on-
liquid-alternative-funds-market/ (describing the myriad manager-focused regulatory requirements that
accompany one's status as a mutual fund manager).
69. See The Retail Alternatives Phenomenon: What Enterprising Private Fund Managers Need To Know,
SEI 18 (2013), http://www.seic.com/IMS/SEI-IMS-RetailAlternatives-US-2013.pdf [hereinafter Retail
Alternatives Phenomenon] ("[M]anagers that distribute funds through RIA networks are commonly required to
pay asset-based fees averaging 40 basis points . . . .").
70. For example, if the sponsor is also the fund's manager, it must become registered as such with the SEC
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2012), a step that entails, among other
things, developing, adhering to, and periodically testing an array of compliance policies and procedures and
engaging a chief compliance officer to oversee the firm's regulatory compliance. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-l(a)(4)
(2016) (discussing role of Chief Compliance Officer).
71. Most managers' objective in entering into such an agreement, known as an expense limitation
agreement, is to "'make a fund more attractive." Expense Limit, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/expense_1imit.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
72. Typical mutual fund service providers are the principal underwriter-who arranges for brokerage firms
to market the fund to prospective investors, fund counsel-who advises the fund on legal and regulatory matters,
the auditor-who audits the fund's financial statements annually, the transfer agent-who maintains the
shareholder roster and records of account balances, and the administrator-who provides many and varied "back
office" services for the fund. See Investment Company Factbook, supra note 23, at 243-48 (describing how a
mutual fund is organized and the roles of its various service providers).
73. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, I
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 168-69(2006) (noting that each mutual fund must have "a board of directors
(or its equivalent) to oversee" its activities and operations).
74. See Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 130 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that "most advisors . . run[] multiple
funds").
75. Among other things, the registration statement of each fund organized after the initial one will likely
be very similar to the initial fund's registration statement, thereby reducing average registration costs. In
addition, each of the service providers to the initial fund will likely charge marginally lower fees for the
2018] 257
The Journal of Corporation Law
concept of the fund group. As Diagram 1 depicts, most mutual funds are not simply stand-
alone entities that exist and operate separately from all other entities but, rather, are part of
a larger operational structure containing other mutual funds. 76
DIAGRAM]
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Fund Group_
The expenses associated with mutual fund sponsorship additionally produce the result
that fund managers traditionally have been the parties who assume the role of sponsor.
After all, managers, above all others involved in a mutual fund's operations, 77 have the
greatest responsibility for-and ultimately stand to gain the most from-what the fund will
do, in terms of its investment and trading activities. Although this circumstance has had a
number of implications for the investment advisory industry, the pertinent one for present
purposes is that the business of managing mutual funds has historically had formidable
services it provides to later funds, at least to the extent that it performs largely the same types of tasks for each
fund. See Overview ofMutual Fund Governance, INDEP. DIRECTORS COUNCIL,
https://www.idc.org/idc/issues/govemance/composition/faqs/overview-fund-gov-idc (last visited Nov. 2, 2017)
("[A]ll of the funds within a fund complex usually receive necessary services from the same entities, are served
by common personnel, and are organized around common operating features."). Moreover, contracts between a
service provider and each fund can generally be "spun off' of the contract used for the initial fund, thereby
obviating repeat rounds of negotiation between the funds and the service provider.
76. See Brown, 664 F.3d at 130 (describing features of mutual fund "complexes" and suggesting that they
are pervasive).
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (listing the various independent service providers that play a
role in a mutual fund's operations).
[Vol. 43:2258
Investors' Paradox
barriers to entry, in that smaller investment advisers have been all but locked out of it.78
Instead, the mutual fund industry has been dominated by the giant mutual fund managers,
such as Capital Group, BlackRock, and PIMCO. 79
However, the dominant parties in the alternative investment arena have been smaller
investment advisers, primarily in their capacities as managers of private funds.80 Indeed,
many private fund managers came into being specifically to deploy the alternative
strategies that their principals had developed as portfolio managers within large financial
firms and to reap the rewards of doing so successfully. By contrast, during the same years
as the private fund "boom"-years in which securities market indices steadily rose and
economies prospered-e stablished mutual fund managers stayed the course, remaining
extremely successful by continuing to focus on public securities.81 In short, while
alternative-focused managers faced cost barriers to breaking into the mutual fund domain,
established managers had little incentive to add an alternative component to that domain.
The result was further to ossify investor stratification.
III. THE PROMISE OF ALTERNATIVE FUNDS
As Part II describes, the need for daily mutual fund share redemptions and an
operational structure that supports the dominance of established managers have led most
mutual funds to eschew alternative strategies. These factors have also reinforced the
division between the retail and sophisticated investor classes. However, although that
division is pronounced, some in the mutual fund industry recently have challenged the
associated assumptions that it is either desirable or inevitable. This Part describes the most
recent developments. Part III.A focuses on the emergence of so-called liquid alternative
funds-mutual funds with alternative investment strategies. Part III.B turns to multi-
manager series trusts, a new type of operational structure that caters to smaller investment
advisers.
A. Liquid Alternative Funds
Whatever the relative risk of investing in public securities versus transacting in, say,
interest rate swaps or investing in private companies, building one's investment portfolio
using only one type of financial instrument creates non-diversification risks, as financial
advisers have long warned.82 That is, in the event of a major economic downturn, investors
78. See Dennis Hartman, Can Anyone Create a Mutual Fund?, POCKETSENSE (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://pocketsense.com/can-anyone-create-mutual-fund-2535.html (observing that "the financial costs and
complexities of mutual fund creation and regulation" make starting a mutual fund "prohibitive for all but a few
would-be fund founders").
79. See Largest Investment Advisers, supra note 16 (listing the ten largest U.S. investment advisers).
80. Cf Kinjal A. Amin, Why Many Investment Managers Struggle to Grab a Slice of
the Pie, LINKEDIN: BLOG (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-many-investment-managers-
struggle-grab-slice-pie-kinjal-amin-cpa (observing that "[i]n the alternative investment industry, size has never
been a determinant of success[,]" and that "[hedge fund] managers have achieved spectacular success with a two
or three person operation").
81. Cf EZRA ZASK, WHITE PAPER, LIQUID AND NEAR LIQUID ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LIQUID ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS (EXCERPT VERSION) 14-15 (2014) (noting the
"strong equity markets backed by strong economic growth and appreciating bond markets" in the years prior to
the financial crisis).
82. See Risk and Diversification: Diversifying Your Portfolio, INVESTOPEDIA,
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whose portfolios hold only public securities are likely to fare more poorly than investors
with more diversified portfolios. 83 At the least, then, there are plausible reasons to
challenge traditional assumptions about what retail investors' portfolios should contain.
It is heartening, therefore, that the post-financial crisis years have been an evolutionary
period for both investors and mutual fund managers. For several decades, investors had
enjoyed a relatively strong securities market coupled with rising bond markets and a robust
economy.84 With the financial crisis, mutual fund investors-institutional investors, in
particular-began to place less emphasis on strong portfolio performance driven by an
appreciating market and instead became increasingly concerned about diversifying their
portfolios and protecting themselves from future steep market declines. 85 The fact that,
post-crisis, economic growth-and, therefore, the prospect of returning to days of yore-
remained unsteady only strengthened this concern.86
Additionally, various constituencies increasingly criticized mutual funds-
specifically, their status as actively-managed investment products-for being too
expensive, given what they do and how well (or not) they have been able to do it. The
claim, effectively, was that the performance that mutual funds had been generating after
the crisis could not justify the management fees that their managers charged. Mutual fund
managers, for their part, began to experience relatively steady asset declines, largely a
result of competition from passively-managed funds and market participants' increasing
advocacy of investment opportunities permitting greater diversification.
Liquid alternative funds were the answer to this downward trending environment. As
their label suggests, these funds' investment strategies are "alternative," in the sense that
they involve complex trading strategies and focus on designated asset classes other than
public securities. In addition, their aim is to generate returns that are uncorrelated to the
returns produced by the public equity- and debt-focused strategies that mutual funds
http://www.investopedia.com/university/risk/risk4.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (observing that "most
investment professionals agree that . . . diversification is the most important component to helping [investors]"
reduce risk in their portfolios).
83. See id. ("Picking different investments with different rates of return will ensure that large gains offset
losses in other areas.").
84. See ZASK, supra note 81, at 14-15 (observing that investors "had the investment wind in their back for
decades with strong equity markets backed by strong economic growth and appreciating bond markets").
85. See id. at 14 (noting that, post-financial crisis, investors, "faced with extremely low interest rates and
slow and uncertain economic growth," have been "rethinking . .. the traditional 60/40 stock/bond portfolio that
has been the mainstay of investments"); id. ("The 2008 crisis has fundamentally changed investors' priorities
from a main emphasis on investment returns and alpha generation to an emphasis on diversification and downside
protection .... ).
86. See CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41332, ECONOMIC RECOVERY: SUSTAINING U.S.
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A POST-CRISIS ECONOMY 5 (2013) (observing that, after the financial crisis, "significant
economic weakness remains evident").
87. See Madison Marriage, Active Managers Defend Their Performance Record, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24,
2016, 7:32 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0b66944-f057-1le5-9f20-c3a047354386.html#axzz4EPOOvGfz
("Finance professors and consumer groups have long argued that active managers charge too much and deliver
too little for their clients.").
88. See ZASK, supra note 81, at 15 (highlighting "competition from hedge funds and ETFs" as a factor
contributing to declining mutual fund assets); 7 Myths About Liquid Alternative Mutual Funds, THE ARBITRAGE
FUNDS 2, https://arbitragefunds.com/restricted/get/7_Myths.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) ("After the 'lost
decade' ending in 2009 . .. ,many advisors recognized their clients needed alternate sources of investment return
that go beyond stocks and bonds.").
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traditionally have used.89 In other words, liquid alternative funds employ the types of
strategies that private funds often use.90 At the same time, however, they are "liquid," in
the sense that they permit daily redemptions, as the Investment Company Act requires of
mutual funds. 9 1
Although liquid alternative funds emerged only within the past decade and, therefore,
are relatively new, they already are well beyond the experimental stages. In May 2014, for
example, the SEC estimated that total assets in liquid alternative funds exceeded $300
billion.92 Other, newer estimates are considerably higher.93
Unlike many private funds' investment strategies, however, the investment strategies
that liquid alternative funds pursue are not completely alternative. Indeed, they cannot be.
This is a product of several reinforcing factors, which stem from the daily-redemption
requirement to which mutual funds are subject,94 combined with a notion that, as
investments, mutual funds should be less risky than private funds. 95 First, a mutual fund
may invest no more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid positions, such as real assets or
securities issued by private companies. 96 Second, a mutual fund generally may not issue
debt, such as bonds and notes. 97 Third, a mutual fund may enter into positions that have
leverage embedded within them, such as most types of derivatives and any other position
that could obligate the fund to pay its counterparty an amount exceeding the payment
89. See Bregstein et al., supra note 68 (describing the investment strategies and objectives of liquid
alternative funds).
90. See ZASK, supra note 81, at 19 (noting that liquid alternative funds use investment strategies, tools, and
markets "that have become identified with hedge funds and private equity funds").
91. See Bregstein et al., supra note 68 (noting that liquid alternative funds have the liquidity characteristics
of "traditional mutual funds"). Although mutual funds are not the only category of fund registered under the
Investment Company Act and, therefore, available to retail investors; see supra note 6, most registered funds that
employ alternative strategies are, in fact, open-end mutual funds. See Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra note
69, at 4 ("Retail alternative products are most often offered as mutual funds .... ).
92. See Norm Champ, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Remarks to the Practicing Law Institute, Private
Equity Forum (June 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542253660 (discussing the
"growing use of alternative investment strategies by open-end mutual funds").
93. See, e.g., Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 2 ("Assets in U.S. alternative mutual funds
and [ETFs] have more than doubled since 2008, and now represent 883 portfolios with more than $550 billion in
assets.").
94. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (describing the implications of the requirement).
95. See Zweig, supra note 11 (suggesting that private offerings are much riskier than investment products
that are available to retail investors).
96. See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-lA, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828 (Mar. 12, 1992) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 239, 274) (setting the limit on a mutual fund's illiquid positions at 15 percent of the fund's total assets);
Bregstein et al., supra note 68 ("The 1940 Act limits a liquid alt from investing in excess of 15 percent of its
assets in illiquid investments.").
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a- I 8(f)( 1) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any registered open-end company to issue
any class of senior security or to sell any senior security of which it is the issuer . . . ."). A mutual fund may,
however, borrow money, provided that its lender is a bank and provided further that its aggregate borrowings do
not exceed one-third of its net assets, excluding the amount of the borrowings. See id.
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required to enter into the position. 98 It may do so, however, only to the extent that it has
set aside sufficient assets to cover the potential liabilities arising from the positions. 99
In light of the portfolio limitations to which liquid alternative funds must adhere, these
funds generally must avoid certain types of alternative strategies, such as those focusing
heavily on highly-leveraged investments, private equity investments, and investments in
distressed companies. However, liquid alternative strategies are nevertheless wide-ranging,
with funds' portfolio activities centering on, for example, long and short securities
positions;100 positions in futures, including equity futures and currency futures; "event-
driven" securities investments; 10 1  and higher-risk fixed-income investments. 102
Accordingly, whatever their limitations, liquid alternative funds have substantially
broadened the menu of retail investment opportunities.
B. Multi-Manager Series Trusts
At the same time that investors and mutual fund managers were in transition after the
financial crisis, the private fund industry experienced its own changes. Among other things,
private fund performance waned and, therefore, so did investor appetite for each next big
investment strategy. 103 Private fund managers, in turn, began to look beyond sophisticated
investors for new avenues to pursue their crafts. Toward that end, many of them began
exploring the possibility of cultivating a new, possibly more promising market-namely,
98. Leverage is, in essence, borrowed capital. Derivatives are deemed to create leverage because the profit
(or loss) on a derivative contract may far exceed the amount of assets that the trader paid to enter into the contract.
See Leverage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms//leverage.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017)
("Leverage is ... the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital to increase the potential return of
an investment.").
99. See Bregstein et al., supra note 68 (observing that although "the SEC has allowed borrowing through
certain leveraged investments (e.g., futures, written options and short sales)[j" mutual fund managers must
"mitigate the risks of leverage either by segregating assets or entering into offsetting transactions to cover possible
liabilities"). Mutual funds' regulatory allowance to transact in derivatives may soon be narrowed, however. In
December 2015, the SEC proposed a rule that would significantly curtail the extent to which mutual funds may
trade in derivatives. See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development
Companies, 80 Fed. Reg. 80,884 (Dec. 28, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) (explaining that the
proposed rule, if adopted, would require a fund that transacts in derivatives to "comply with one of two alternative
portfolio limitations").
100. As its label implies, a long/short equity strategy is one in which a fund takes both long ("buy and hold")
positions and short positions in securities. See Long/Short Equity, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms//long-shortequity.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (defining "long/short
equity" as "[a]n investing strategy of taking long positions in stocks that are expected to appreciate and short
positions in stocks that are expected to decline").
101. An event-driven investment is an investment made based on a decline in a company's stock price that
was triggered by a particular event and the belief that the decline is only temporary. See Event-Driven Strategy,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/eventdriven.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (defining
"event-driven strategy" as "[a] strategy . . . that attempts to take advantage of events such as mergers and
restructurings that can result in the short-term mispricing of a company's stock").
102. See Fixed-Income Investments and Bonds, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/fixed-income-
bonds/overview (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (explaining that "[fjixed income investments generally pay a retum
on a fixed schedule, though the amount of the payments can vary" and that "[i]ndividual bonds may be the best
known type of fixed income security").
103. See Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 8 (listing challenges facing hedge funds in recent
years).
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the retail investor market. 104 The idea was that well-honed private fund strategies could be
imported to mutual funds, thereby giving a much larger group of investors access to them
and rewarding the managers with fees based on pools of assets potentially much larger than
the private funds they had been managing.los
Although some private fund managers could readily move into the mutual fund arena
because they had sufficient resources to start their own manager-centered fund groups,
many managers-smaller, newer ones-confronted formidable obstacles to doing so. 106
Among other things, these managers could not afford the price of admission. As Part II
details, the expenses associated with sponsoring a fund group are considerablel07 and, as
one might expect, are substantially greater than the costs associated with sponsoring one
or more hedge funds.108 In addition, a mutual fund manager in a manager-centered
structure must ultimately attract sufficient investor capital to realize cost efficiencies. This
imperative is a particular obstacle for smaller managers, whose names and services are not
widely known.
In light of the challenges confronting smaller managers, creative thinkers-in the form
of fund administrators and others who stood to gain from being creative-developed a new
operational structure: the multi-manager series trust. In many respects, the series trust
structure, in which a number of funds (each, a series) are organized within an umbrella
trust, is similar to a manager-centered fund group. The critical difference is the identity of
the sponsor. Whereas, in the manager-centered context, the would-be fund group manager
is the guiding force, in the series trust context sponsor responsibilities rest with a third-
party firm that plays no role in managing any of the assets of any fund within the trust. 109
In this new model, the sponsor typically has another, usually primary, business that
involves providing a particular service to mutual funds or their managers, and its intent in
sponsoring a series trust is typically to provide that service to the trust and the funds within
it. Often, the sponsor is a mutual fund administrator,'10 which provides myriad critical
104. See id. at 4 (describing fund managers' growing interest in the retail alternative investment market);
ZASK, supra note 81, at 16 (observing that hedge funds are targeting "the $30 trillion investment market that has
been monopolized by mutual funds and other regulated management companies" for new sources of capital).
105. Although the fees that fund managers earn by managing liquid altemative funds are generally lower
than the fees that most managers could earn by managing private funds, they generally are more steady and
reliable. This is a particular advantage for managers of private equity funds, who typically are not paid as to any
particular portfolio investment until the investment is sold, which could be ten or more years after the investment
is made. See Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 9.
106. This discrepancy among fund managers has been particularly acute, moreover, given that the flagging
enthusiasm for hedge funds has disproportionately affected smaller managers, who have had the greatest difficulty
attracting additional assets from institutional investors. See Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 8
(observing that, in recent years, managers managing at least $1 billion (per manager) of hedge fund assets have
attracted more than 60% of hedge fund investments made by institutional investors).
107. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text (detailing the expenses that mutual fund sponsors
typically bear).
108. See, e.g., Hedge Funds Plodding into Mutual Funds, HEDGE FUND ALERT (Apr. 10, 2013), (on file with
author) (reporting that the cost of sponsoring a mutual fund may be up to $200,000 higher than the cost of
sponsoring a hedge fund).
109. See U.S. BANCORP FUND SERVICES, LLC, MSTS EXPERIENCE RECORD GROWTH 2 (2013),
http://www.usbfs.com/usbfs/documents/2013/white-papers/USBFSMST-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
BANCORP, GROWTH OF MSTs] (observing that the sponsor in this alternative structure is typically a service
provider to the fund).
110. See Special Research Report: Selecting a Series Trust, INFOVEST21, at 5 (Aug. 2013),
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back-office functions for mutual funds,111 but, at least in theory, it could instead be a law
firm whose clients are fund managers or a firm that provides custodial or transfer agent
services to mutual funds. Although the sponsor plays no role in any particular fund's
performance and, therefore, the fund's ultimate success or failure, its incentive is not unlike
a mutual fund manager's in sponsoring a fund group, in that each fund that it forms is
another source of revenues.
The genius of series trusts for private fund managers aiming to manage mutual funds
is this: because the sponsor of a trust is a firm other than the manager, the trust can-and
does-comprise funds managed by many different managers, rather than just one.112 The
further result is that each manager within the structure is able to participate in the cost
efficiencies that a fund group structure permits and bears only a pro rata portion of the
group's costs and expenses.11 3 It therefore need not raise the amount of investor capital
that is typically necessary to support multiple funds' profitability and success. In effect, as
Diagram 2 suggests, by becoming part of a series trust, a manager does something akin to
leasing space in an office building, rather than buying the entire building and occupying
all of its floors. 114
http://files.ctctedn.com/f9e8414cOO1/0268fl40-8479-41e6-8710-6691b2d6538d.pdf [hereinafter Selecting a
Series Trust] (observing that administrators are typically the sponsors of series trusts).
111. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting the role of a mutual fund administrator).
112. See Bob Kern, Best practices in Mutual Fund Shared Trusts, U.S. BANCORP FUND SERVICES, LLC 1
(2017),
https://www.usbank.com/usbfs/documents/2016/White%20papers/USBankBest%20practices%20mutual%20f
unds%20shared%20trust..whitepaper.pdf
("The [series trust] structure is ... utilized by multiple, unrelated investment management firms to house their
mutual fund products.").
113. U.S. BANCORP, GROWTH OF MSTS, supra note 109, at 3 (observing that an advantage of a series trust
is that it "provides economies of scale for certain fund startup and annual operating costs" and that "certain annual
operating expenses for a fund within [a series trust] are reduced due to the allocation of certain costs across all
funds within the Trust").
114. Cf Selecting a Series Trust, supra note 110, at 6 (noting that, when managers join a series trust, they
"simply plug into the service model offered by the series trust sponsor").
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In addition, given these efficiencies, substantially less time is required for a manager
to organize a fund within a series trust, as compared with organizing the initial fund in a
manager-centered fund group. 15 Among other things, the manager need not concern itself
with selecting an administrator, an underwriter, fund counsel, custodians, or an auditor
because the trust's board of directors-which serves also as the board for each fund in the
trust 16-in conjunction with the sponsor, will have already appointed them.117 The
manager also need not spend time overseeing each service provider as they perform their
duties or addressing other trust-related matters, insofar as such tasks pertain to other funds
in the trust or to the trust as a whole. As a result, managers are able to begin operating their
funds much more quickly than would be possible in the manager-centered context. 18
115. See id. (observing that "[t]ime saving is another plus" with a series trust and that "[s]etting up a series
trust new fund launch can be as short as 3 1/2 months").
116. See U.S. BANCORP, GROWTH OF MSTS, supra note 109, at 3-4 (noting that the funds within a series
trust have a common board of trustees).
117. See Selecting a Series Trust, supra note 110, at 6 ('The [multi-manager] series trust typically provides
fund administration, fund accounting and transfer agent services and has selected a team of other service providers
to service the trust such as legal counsel, auditors, custodian and distributor.").
118. See Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 21 ("[A] shared trust potentially offers lower
operating costs, operational efficiencies through a leveraged platform, access to trust-level selling agreements,
and a much shorter time to market."); Selecting a Series Trust, supra note 110, at 6 ("Much of the [series trust]
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To be clear, many of the funds within series trusts are liquid alternative funds, which
should not be surprising given that many of the managers seeking to manage an alternative
fund originated as private fund managers. 1l 9 In that sense, it may seem that the series trust
structure does not contribute anything to the retail investment market beyond what liquid
alternative funds sponsored by larger managers contribute. Yet the fact that these trusts
provide a way for smaller managers to offer their investment services to retail investors
and that many such managers have "grown up" pursuing alternative strategies means that
series trusts substantially increase the variety of alternative investment options for retail
investors. Additionally, the fact that the managers operating within series trusts generally
would not be able to manage retail investor assets but for the lower-cost structure means
that the trusts' emergence should be considered a new development in the retail investment
realm, separate from the broader development of liquid alternative funds. It is, moreover,
an important development. Despite the fact that many outside of the mutual fund industry
are not yet aware of the existence of series trusts,120 the trusts have been extremely
successful in the short time that they have existed, attracting more than $64 billion in
investor capital by mid-2013. 12 1
Of course, one might wonder why, if series trusts are a panacea for smaller managers
seeking to move beyond managing private funds, these trusts did not emerge considerably
earlier than they did. The answer, once again, points to the monumental changes that the
investment advisory industry has experienced over the past nine years. In pre-crisis years,
the division between the investment products available only to sophisticated investors and
those available to retail investors was not only relatively sharp but also seemingly
sensible-or, at least, was in a point of stasis that was relatively satisfactory for all
involved. When the bifurcated world lost balance, new possibilities were bound to present
themselves.
IV. THE RISKS OF REDUCING RISK
The emergence of liquid alternative funds and series trusts opens a world of
opportunities for retail investors. By giving retail investors access to investment strategies
to which only sophisticated investors previously had access, the new investment products
enable retail investors to diversify their portfolios in a way that only sophisticated investors
previously could. Accordingly, although alternative funds cannot completely dissolve the
dichotomy, in terms of diversification and investment choices, between investors deemed
sophisticated and everyone else, they are poised to erode it-perhaps substantially.
However, alternative funds serve little purpose-and, indeed, harm those whom they
are supposed to benefit-if investors take advantage of them without an adequate
understanding of why an investment in any one of them is appropriate or how that
investment might serve a diversification function within their overall portfolios. And, in
fund launch process is procedural and relatively easy to predict from a cost and timing perspective.").
119. See Selecting a Series Trust, supra note 110, at 4 ("More administrators are bringing out series trusts
because it provides an easier entry for hedge fund managers to access retail channels.").
120. Indeed, as of summer 2016, there were no published scholarly discussions of the structure and only
scant coverage in the popular media.
121. See Selecting a Series Trust, supra note 110, at 15 (setting forth the amount of assets in series trusts
sponsored by Atlantic Fund Services, ALPS, Gemini Fund Services, Ultimus Fund Solutions, and U.S. Bancorp
Fund Services but not reporting asset information about several others, including SEI, one of the dominant trust
sponsors).
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fact, there is reason to be concerned: investors steadily evince scant understanding of why
any particular fund might be a better choice than another, let alone why any particular mix
of funds might be more optimal than another. The problems run deeply, moreover, because
they arise from two, mutually-reinforcing structural impediments-namely, disclosure
requirements under the securities laws and the procedures by which investment products
are offered and sold to investors. Each of these impediments, which Sections III.A and
1II.B discuss in turn, hinders investors' ability to make prudent investment decisions.
A. Disclosure
The promise of alternative funds cannot be realized if retail investors lack the
knowledge required to use these funds effectively-and, indeed, it is likely that few
investors presently have that knowledge.122 Critically, however, there are a number of
factors, described below, preventing a more favorable result. These factors are wholly
unrelated to alternative funds qua fund type; rather, they are obstacles to informed retail-
investor decision-making in general and have been for decades.
Appreciating these obstacles begins with the fact that U.S. securities regulation has
traditionally relied on disclosure as the primary regulatory tool for achieving its goals of
promoting market integrity and protecting investors.123 The driving principle is that these
goals are best served not by regulators' passing judgment on the merits of any particular
investment product-for how could regulators competently do that?-but, instead, by their
ensuring that would-be investors are informed of the risks associated with the product. 124
The complementary principle is that investors will be able to become informed about an
investment product if they are given disclosure documents that set forth specified facts
about it.125 With such information, an investor should be able to make an investment
decision with open eyes and, furthermore, should be prepared for, or at least not surprised
by, the success or failure of the investment. 126
And so it is with mutual funds. Every functioning mutual fund has prepared a
registration statement that performs this disclosure function and that the SEC has reviewed
and approved. Further, every mutual fund must deliver the "prospectus" component of that
document to investors prior to or at the time of their investments.127 However, although a
122. Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 3 ("[N]early half of individual investors say they
have little or no understanding of alternatives . . . .").
123. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (2011) ("[D]isclosure has become the default remedy in many areas of securities
regulation, as well as many other areas of public policy.").
124. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws-
Why the Specially Tailored Exemption must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735,
1741 (2012) ("The federal securities laws do not focus on the merits of investments but rather are based on
disclosure to allow sufficiently informed investors to fend for themselves.").
125. For example, companies effecting a public offering of securities "must file a registration statement with
the [SEC] and distribute a statutory prospectus to potential investors." Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the
Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27,
28(1998).
126. See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Information, SEC, http://www.columbia.edu/-hcsl4/SEC.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2017)
(noting that disclosure documents "disclose information about the companies' financial condition and business
practices to help investors make informed investment decisions").
127. See Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Mutual Funds and the International Marketplace: A Regulatory Challenge, 32
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fund's prospectus could impart to investors any information they might wish to know about
a fund, in fact, it typically tells them nothing.
This is so for several reasons.128 First, time limitations deter investors from expending
effort researching investment options. They also lead investors to ignore information that
was handed to them and that thereby necessitates no research effort on their part at all. 129
Second, even if investors were to attempt to read the information they are given, they may
not be able to proceed far because even simple information can be overwhelming if there
is too much of it. 130 Third, because much of the disclosure aimed at retail investors,
including mutual fund prospectuses, is extremely complex,131 even an investor who reads
a prospectus cover to cover likely will not understand at least part of it. Fourth, even if she
were to understand the prospectus completely, she likely would not know how to deploy
the information it contains to her advantage.132 Finally, and separate from whether
investors read or understand disclosure, is the fact that investors tend to be overconfident
in making investment decisions, leading them to assume that disclosure can be safely
ignored. 133
These insights are far from new or original. Scores of scholars have taken the SEC's
current disclosure regime to task for being a singularly inadequate mechanism for
protecting investors. 134 Among the primary reasons for disclosure's failure are those
TULSA L.J. 747, 749 (1998) ("To sell shares, a mutual fund must have an effective registration statement on file
with the SEC, and it must deliver a prospectus to each investor."). Ifrequested, the fund must also give the investor
a second component of the registration statement, called the statement of additional information ("SAl"). See
Statement of Additional Information - SAI, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sai.asp (last
visited Nov. 2, 2017) ("[S]ome investors find the SAl useful and although fund companies are not required to
provide it, they must give it to investors upon request and without charge.").
128. See Bevis Longstreth, The Profile: Designer Disclosure for Mutual Funds, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1019,
1031 (1998) ("[M]ost retail investors do not read the prospectus or SAl, due to their length, complexity and lack
of information useful in the selection of mutual funds.").
129. This is often the case with mutual fund prospectuses. See Gary 0. Cohen, SEC Disclosure Report to
Congress Mandated By Dodd-Frank Act as Applicable to Mutual Funds and Variable Annuities, in CONFERENCE
ON LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY PRODUCTS (Am. L. Inst. Continuing Legal Educ. 2012) (noting that "[tlwo-thirds
of fund investors who received fund prospectuses rarely (28%), very rarely (14%), or never (2 1%) read [them]
when received").
130. See Onmi Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure ofMandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
647, 687 (2011) (arguing that, when disclosures are too long and detailed, "disclosees do not read them and cannot
understand, assimilate, and analyze the avalanche of information"); William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power:
An Analysis ofRents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1465 (2006) (noting that
"mutual fund shareholders are ... overwhelmed by hundreds of pages of disclosure").
131. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks ofthe Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139, 185 (2006) ("The complexity and detail
in disclosure documents can make them almost incomprehensible at times .... ); Homer Kripke, The Myth of
the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631, 632-33 (1973) (discussing how "lay" investors do not understand the
technical details and complexities of disclosure documents and concluding that "the securities prospectus is fairly
close to worthless").
132. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, What is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 335, 348 (2012) (observing that "[i]nvestors faced with th[e] flood of information"
in disclosure documents required under the securities laws "often lack the skills to identify what the information
means or how to use it effectively").
133. See Ripken, supra note 131, at 167 ("Investors may ignore [disclosure] because they feel confident that
their superior investment strategies will produce successful outcomes, regardless of the disclosed risks.").
134. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff& Claire M. Hill, Limits ofDisclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 633
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described above. However, scholars generally have overlooked another, more important
reason why disclosure would fail at its job, even if investors were not too time-constrained,
confused, or overwhelmed by it and even if they could competently use it to make better
investment choices: disclosure, as regulation presently conceives it, does not give an
investor the one type of information that she most needs-namely, context-specific
information about the role that a particular fund could play in the investor's overall
portfolio. In other words, disclosure about a particular investment does not help investors
achieve appropriate portfolio diversification.
Exacerbating retail investors' plight is the fact that many retail investors do not obtain
help with the investment process from investment fiduciaries,135 such as registered
investment advisers. 136 Investors may simply deem the cost of doing so prohibitive or, in
any event, not worth any resulting benefit, given their often-limited investment assets. 137
Additionally, many investment advisers do not accept retail investors as clients, given the
advisers' requirements that clients have a threshold amount of assets as to which they are
seeking advice. 138
Accordingly, most retail investors who have the benefit of advice obtain it, instead,
from brokerage firms. Because brokerage firms are typically compensated by particular
(2013) (analyzing "the limits of disclosure" directed at "sophisticated investors in the securities market"); Henry
Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1601, 1714 (2012) (suggesting that "financial innovation has helped create complexities that bedevil the
longstanding disclosure regime"); Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U. CIN.
L. REV. 421, 423 (2012) (evaluating "the disastrous failure of disclosure" to protect investors); Prentice, supra
note 123, at 1064-65 ("[A]utomatic resort to disclosure as a remedy for every problem is inadequate and
occasionally counterproductive."); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 130, at 742 (arguing that disclosure
requirements are "prone to failure"); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A
Proposal for Tailored Disclosure to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 749,
751 (2007) ("Existing [public company] disclosure requirements place too much discretion in the hands of
executives, cause pressure on important individual rights, and tend to cause investors and markets to overreact.").
135. See Jeremy Burke & Angela A. Hung, Do Financial Advisers Influence Savings Behavior?, RAND
CORP. 3, 5 (2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research-reports/RR1289.html (noting that "there is considerable
research suggesting that those in most need of financial advice are the least likely to receive it" and that
"individuals who engage financial advisers tend to be more financially healthy and sophisticated than individuals
who forgo advice").
136. See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be Fiduciaries,
87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 710 (2012) (describing the legal standard that applies to brokerage firms in making
investment recommendations).
137. See Letter From IRI to Employment Benefits Security Administration Re Definition of Fiduciary
Proposed Rule (Feb. 3, 2011), in INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AND ANNUITIES: THE EMERGING
REGULATORY OUTLOOK 117 (Am. L. Inst. 2014) ("[S]mall investors cannot afford to pay a fee-only adviser's
fixed rate fee."); Mary Anne Waldron, Spousal Guarantees and Conceptual Complexity: Can We Find a Better
Solution?, 16 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 391, 418 (2000-2001) (noting that "first-class financial advice" is
expensive).
138. See Geoff Williams, How to Find a Financial Advisor If You're Not Rich, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Feb. 26, 2014, 11:56 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/financial-advisors/articles/2014/
02/26/how-to-find-a-financial-advisor-if-youre-not-rich ("[M]any financial advisors simply aren't interested in
working with the middle class."). The proliferation of online advisers in recent years may be changing this
situation. See Jonathan Clements, It's Time to End Financial Advisers' 1% Fees, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2015,
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/its-time-to-end-financial-advisers- 1-fees-I1421545038 ("Thanks to
online advisers, helping investors build globally diversified portfolios has become a low-cost, commodity
service.").
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funds (or their managers) based on the firms' success in selling shares of those funds, this
approach is considerably more economical for investors, as compared with paying out-of-
pocket fees to investment advisers. 139 As the next section details, however, the trade-off is
that brokerage firms generally are not fiduciaries to the investors whom they advise. 140
This means that, in recommending investments, a brokerage firm's personnel may consider
factors that conflict with a single-minded focus on their customers' best interests. 141
The picture becomes bleaker still when one considers that the deficiencies associated
with disclosure do not afflict all quadrants of the investor universe. In particular,
sophisticated investors fare much better than retail investors in a disclosure-based securities
regulatory regime.
For one thing, disclosure is a much less significant part of the regulatory backdrop of
sophisticated investors' activities in the securities markets. As classic cases on the
Securities Act's registration exemptions recognized, as compared to retail investors,
sophisticated investors have less need for disclosure because they are better able to obtain
necessary facts and data through other means.142 The SEC embedded this principle in Rule
506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act, the most frequently used "private placement"
safe harbor. 14 3 Under Rule 506, a securities issuer need not provide extensive disclosure
to investors who meet the "accredited investor" financial test, 144 presumably because those
investors are able to negotiate for or otherwise procure whatever information about the
issuer or its securities they might deem relevant. 145
In addition, to the extent that sophisticated investors rely on disclosure, they are
generally better able than retail investors to understand it, as well as how best to use it.146
139. See Daisy Maxey, Ruling Near on Fiduciary Duty for Brokers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2014, 4:51 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ruling-near-on-fiduciary-duty-for-brokers-1396894687 (suggesting that most retail
investors that obtain advice do so from brokerage firms, which are compensated for that advice through receiving
commissions for executing transactions for their customers, rather than through charging separate fees).
140. See Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State ofBroker-Dealer Regulation and the Case for an Authentic
Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. CoRuP. & FIN. L. 203, 218 (2011) ("[B]roker-
dealer customers are afforded less protection than investment adviser customers because broker-dealers are
generally not held to a fiduciary standard.").
141. Although any investment recommendation that a brokerage firm provides to a client must, under
applicable rules, be "suitable" for that client, that standard permits the firm to consider a number of factors in
making the recommendation, including whether the firm will receive any compensation (such as a brokerage
commission) in connection with executing the recommended transaction. See Laby, supra note 136.
142. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 897, 905 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a
purported private offering is valid only if "each offeree had been furnished information about the issuer ... or ...
had effective access to such information" and that "the investment sophistication of the offeree assumes added
importance" when the issuer "relies on the offeree's access").
143. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2016).
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2016) (providing that an issuer must furmish information only to
"purchasers" who are not accredited investors); id. § 230.501(a) (defining "accredited investor"). Despite this
exemption, issuers usually provide disclosure documents to prospective investors, whether accredited or not.
However, those documents typically are not subject to regulatory review and do not include all of the types of
information that must be included in a mutual fund's registration statement.
145. See Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239) (suggesting that Regulation
D does not require that issuers deliver information to accredited investors because such investors are capable of
"negotiating in their own interest").
146. This claim is effectively a truism, given that the standards by which an investor is deemed
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Finally, sophisticated investors make greater use of investment advisers than do retail
investors. 147 They do so not only because they have larger portfolios, for which they
require greater assistance in "putting to work" in the financial markets, but also because
they have the financial means to satisfy advisers' minimum asset thresholds. 14 8
Accordingly, notwithstanding retail investors' newly-found access to some of the
types of investments that, for years, have been staples in sophisticated investors' portfolios,
there remains a formidable discrepancy between the two categories of investors. Whereas
sophisticated investors have the resources and the connections to obtain critical information
about prospective investments, retail investors do not. That fact is all the more problematic
given that securities regulation aims to protect the retail variety of investors above all
othersl49 and that mutual funds are the mainstay of retail investment activity.150
B. Distribution Channels
As Part III suggests, the deficiencies of disclosure have not deterred retail investors
from investing in alternative funds. 15 1 Indeed, the incongruity between what investors
know about alternative funds and their apparent eagerness to participate in them is startling.
Yet if retail investors face daunting obstacles to investing wisely, why have they seemingly
flocked to alternative funds? The answer is that disclosure requirements are the province
of regulators and may or may not work as they should. By contrast, selling shares of mutual
funds is the province of financial firms that must pursue investors to ensure their ongoing
revenue streams.152 In short, disclosure is a matter of public policy, while attracting retail
investors' capital is a matter of profit.
To be sure, this articulation of the dichotomy is likely too stark, in that a variety of
factors contribute to investors' particular investment choices. Still, the avenues by which
mutual fund shares are marketed and sold to retail investors share a label that seems all but
unrelated to investors' best interests: distribution channels. Although the distribution
"sophisticated" are based on the notion that those who satisfy the tests are capable of competently evaluating
prospective investments. Otherwise, the claim that the investors in a private offering "are likely to be sophisticated
business people," has little foundation. Private Placement of Securities, INC.,
http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/private-placement-of-securities.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). Of course,
even sophisticated investors experience difficulty grasping--or, in some cases, heeding-disclosed information.
See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, Reading the Fine Print in Abacus and Other Soured Deals, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 2012, 2:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/reading-the-fine-print-in-abacus-
and-other-soured-deals/ (detailing how some sophisticated investors incurred losses during the financial crisis as
a result of their failure to read or properly use relevant disclosures).
147. See Burke & Hung, supra note 135, at 3 (noting that sophisticated investors are more likely than retail
investors to use financial advisers).
148. See Williams, supra note 138 (noting that many financial advisers eschew working with lower-income
investors).
149. See Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1103 (2009) ("The SEC's core
competence is protection of the retail investor.").
150. See Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37
DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 780 (2013) ("Retail investors today hold equity largely through intermediaries such as
pension funds and mutual funds.").
151. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (noting that investors have placed substantial capital
with alternative funds).
152. See infra notes 153-174 and accompanying text (discussing the role that financial professionals play in
selling mutual fund shares).
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channels that are primarily aimed at retail investors differ in many respects, as the rest of
this section discusses, they have an important characteristic in common: none of them
appreciably improves retail investors' ability to invest in alternative funds on an informed
basis or helps investors use alternative funds (or, indeed, traditional funds) to their best
diversification potential. None, in other words, appreciably mitigates the concerns
described in the previous section.
1. The Advice Channel
The advice channel is perhaps the most important distribution channel for retail
investors who invest assets held outside of retirement plans. 153 It is defined by an
intermediary that recommends particular funds to its customers or clients and, in most
cases, helps them buy shares of selected funds. This intermediary is typically a brokerage
firm, whose primary function is to execute securities trades on its customers' behalf, often
giving them investment advice in connection with that service and usually earning a
commission in return.154 However, it might instead be an investment adviser or a financial
planner, businesses that center on advising clients on portfolio allocation, typically for an
agreed-upon fee. 155 Or, it might be one of any of a number of other types of financial
professionals.156 Yet despite the potential of its advisory function, the advice channel
arguably does little to help retail investors make informed investment decisions.
As an initial matter, the individuals working on behalf of any given financial institution
("representatives" of that institution) may fail to adequately advise their clients about
alternative funds. 157 That may be the case if a representative does not understand
alternative products sufficiently to provide competent advice about investing in them. 158
153. In 2012, over half of all households with mutual fund investments made those investments through the
advice channel. See Sea of Change on the Horizon: U.S. Fund Distribution 2014, EY 6 (2014),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-the-state-of-us-fund-distribution-in-2014/$File/ey-us-fund-
distribution-report.pdf [hereinafter EY]; see also Brian K. Reid & John D. Rea, Mutual Fund Distribution
Channels and Distribution Costs, 9 INVEST. CO. INST. PERSP. 1, 3 (July 2003), https://www.ici.org/pdf/per09-
03.pdf (observing that, "[a]s a share of mutual fund assets, the advice channel is the largest, accounting for an
estimated 55 percent of all mutual fund assets at the end of 2002," and citing a 2001 household survey showing
that 37 percent of respondents regarded the advice channel "as the primary purchase channel").
154. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text (noting that most retail investors who seek advice as
to their investment decisions do so from brokerage firms); Laby, supra note 136, at 709 (observing that individuals
often seek investment advice from brokerage firms).
155. See Jason Van Bergen, Paying Your Investment Advisor-Fees or Commissions?, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/04/022704.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (discussing how advisers
that provide objective advice as to an investor's entire portfolio are typically "fee-only" advisers).
156. See EY, supra note 153, at 6 (observing that the advice channel "includes ... financial advisors, private
bankers, registered investment advisors, full-service brokers, independent financial planners, investment service
representatives of banks and savings institutions, insurance agents and accountants").
157. See, e.g., Kirsten Grind, Financial Advisers, Firms Spar Over Alternative Funds, WALL ST. J. (May 27,
2014, 6:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/financial-advisers-firms-spar-over-altemative-funds-
1401229173?alg=y (observing that some financial advisers are "avoiding" alternative funds).
158. See id. (quoting a financial adviser as saying that alternative funds "are like a black hole" and that she
does not "like buying something when I don't understand what's in them"); see also Russ Alan Prince, Liquid
Alternatives: Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds For the Masses?, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2014, 6:15 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2014/11/06/liquid-altematives-hedge-funds-and-private-equity-
funds-for-the-masses/ (suggesting that the strategies and risks of liquid alternative funds are often difficult to
understand and that financial advisers must expend time and effort to do so); Michael Winchell, How Should
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If, for example, the representative's experience centers on advising clients about traditional
public securities investments-say, mutual funds that invest primarily in large-
capitalization stocks-then she almost assuredly will have less understanding of such
matters as how the futures markets operate or the risks associated with trading call
options.1 59 Alternatively, a representative may purposely avoid recommending alternative
funds. For example, Edward Jones, a financial advisory firm, in 2015 instructed its
personnel not to recommend or sell shares of alternative funds, reportedly because of the
funds' relative complexity and because the funds may use leverage.1 60
An additional difficulty with the advice channel is specific to brokerage firms that play
the role of adviser, in that the regulatory requirements applicable to brokerage firms in
connection with providing investment advice are less stringent than those to which
investment advisers are subject. To be sure, brokerage firms are subject to extensive
regulation in their own right, in their capacities as "broker-dealers" under the securities
laws. 16 1 Indeed, that regulation is the primary reason why Congress, in formulating the
securities laws, permitted brokerage firms to provide any investment advice at all. 162
However, because brokerage firms are not regulated as investment advisers in connection
with doing so, they traditionally have not been required to act in the best interests of their
clients-or, at least, they have been allowed simultaneously to act in their own interests. 163
Advisors Evaluate Alternative Strategies, DAILYALTS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://dailyalts.com/how-should-advisors-
evaluate-alternative-strategies/ (noting that many financial advisers do not sufficiently understand how to evaluate
liquid alternative funds).
159. A representative's failure to understand alternative products to the same extent that she understands the
nature and risks of investing in equity securities or bonds may either avoid advising its clients (investors) about
mutual funds with alternative strategies or may nonetheless do so. Either way, the result is troublesome for the
goal of producing informed retail investors, in that either the investor's portfolio will not include alternative
products, or the ones that it does include may not be suitable for the investor's particular investment profile and
objectives.
160. See Grind, supra note 157 (reporting that Edward Jones "advised its 13,150 financial [representatives]
to avoid selling liquid-alternative funds"). This skepticism, moreover, is likely not merely sporadic or fleeting,
given that the financial advisory firms that share it are among some of the largest and longest-operating ones. See
id. (noting that Vanguard Group, which is "the largest mutual-fund firm in the U.S. by assets," is also wary of
liquid alternative funds and has determined not to "expand[] into the sector").
161. Brokerage firms are primarily regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78o-1-78o-3 (2012), and the rules that the SEC has adopted pursuant to authority granted by the
Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2016).
162. See Laby, supra note 136, at 723. Under securities laws and rules, a brokerage firm may provide
advisory services without being deemed (and, therefore, regulated) as an investment adviser, so long as it meets
two requirements. First, the advice that the firm provides must be "solely incidental to" the brokerage services
that it provides. See id. Second, the firm must not receive any "special compensation" for providing advice,
meaning that it cannot receive any compensation beyond what it receives from performing brokerage services
(usually a commission, calculated as a percentage of the value of securities traded). See id. Accordingly, brokerage
firms may and do provide investment advice without thereby transforming themselves into investment advisers.
163. See White House Fact Sheet: Strengthening Retirement Security By Cracking Down on Conflicts of
Interest in Retirement Savings, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20160406-0 (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) [hereinafter White
House Fact Sheet] (observing that not all investment professionals were "legally obligated" to "act[] in their
customers' best interests" and that "the broken regulatory system had allowed misaligned incentives to steer
customers into investments that have higher fees or lower returns-costing some middle-class families tens of
thousands of dollars of their retirement savings").
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In other words, unlike investment advisers, they have not been fiduciaries to their
clients. 164
Brokers' non-fiduciary status has recently changed, at least in part. Thanks to a rule
that the U.S. Department of Labor adopted in 2016, brokerage firms and their
representatives have become subject to fiduciary obligations in connection with advising
investors seeking to invest retirement plan or IRA assets. 165 More precisely, under the new
rule, representatives can no longer accept compensation that creates conflicts of interest,
such as sales commissions based on the number of shares of a particular issuer-a mutual
fund, for example-that a representative sells.166 Although the election of President Trump
spawned speculation that the new administration would repeal the rule -67and, indeed,
the administration delayed the rule's compliance date 68-it now appears that the rule will
survive largely intact.169 It also appears that, even if the rule were repealed eventually,
164. See id. The Department of Labor has noted that conflicted advice provided by non-fiduciary advisers
have "cost America's families an estimated $17 billion a year." Id.
165. See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice, 81
Fed. Reg. 20,945, 20,977 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, and 2550) (defining a
fiduciary conflict of interest).
166. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 163. Any brokerage firm wishing to continue to receive
commission-based compensation may rely on an exemption for those who "commit to providing advice that
serves customers' best interests, "charge only reasonable compensation, and avoid misleading statements about
fees and conflicts of interest." Id.
167. On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum directing the Department of Labor to
"examine the Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain
access to retirement information and financial advice." See Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor on the
Fiduciary Duty Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Feb. 7, 2017) (to be published in the Fed. Reg.),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule.
168. Based on President Trump's directive to the Department of Labor, see supra note 167, the Department
postponed the rule's original April 10, 2017 compliance date by 60 days, to June 9, 2017. See Definition of the
Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption
(Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2016-01); Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets
Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (Prohibited Transaction
Exemption 2016-02); Prohibited Transaction Exemptions 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-1, 84-24, 86-128, 82 Fed.
Reg. 16,902 (Apr. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 250). In addition, although the rule's fiduciary
requirements are now in effect, implementation of the associated "best-interest contract exemption that allows
brokers to charge variable compensation . . . as long as they sign a legally binding agreement to put their clients'
interests ahead of their own" has been pushed back from the original implementation date of January 1, 2018 to
July 1, 2019. Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL Fiduciary Rule: Agency Says It Will Come Up With New Ways to Comply
During Delay Period, INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 30, 2017, 2:34 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170830/FREE/170839993/dol-fiduciary-rule-agency-says-it-will-
come-up-with-new-ways-to; DOL Fiduciary Rule Explained as of August 31, 2017, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/updates/dol-fiduciary-rule/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) ("[F]ull implementation of
all elements of the rule has been pushed back to July 1, 2019."). However, one effect of the delay in implementing
the fiduciary rule's exemption provisions is a delay in implementing the private enforcement components of those
provisions. See Ashlea Ebeling, Will DOL Gut Fiduciary Rule By Latest July 1, 2019 Extension?, FORBES (Aug.
9, 2017, 5:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017/08/09/will-dol-gut-fiduciary-rule-by-latest-
july- 1-2019-extension/# I bI b7f235840.
169. See Michael Kitces, DoL Fiduciary [Rule] Not Yet Delayed By President Trump After All, KITCES.COM
(Feb. 4, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.kitces.com/blog/president-trump-executive-order-memorandum-no-
fiduciary-rule-delay/ ("At a minimum ... it's looking increasingly likely that the DoL fiduciary rule will be here
to stay in some form."); Jacklyn Wille, Trump and the Fiduciary Rule: The Uncertainty of What's Ahead,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/trump-fiduciary-rule-n57982083674/ (citing informed
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brokerage firms would not alter the business models and compensation practices that they
adopted to comply with the rule. 170
Even so, despite the advice channel's dependence on brokerage firms' selling (and
commission-producing) efforts and the relative dominance of retirement plan participants
and IRA holders among mutual fund investors, 171 the rule's effect on the advice channel
may be limited. As described below, investors who invest in mutual funds through
retirement plans typically do so without the benefit of investment advice, whether of the
fiduciary variety or otherwise.172 Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that the new
rule does not cover investment assets beyond those held through retirement plans or in
IRAs. As a result, whatever may be the new rule's ultimate benefits, it leaves a considerable
swath of investors and assets unprotected by fiduciary standards.
It is difficult to say with any precision how problematic brokerage firms' limited
fiduciary status is for retail investors, in terms of the quality and objectivity of the advice
they provide. Based on the publicity that the issue received from both scholars and the
press in the aftermath of the financial crisis, however, one would be forgiven for believing
that the absence of a broker-specific fiduciary obligation subjects investors to risks that
most investors do not even realize exist. 173 And, indeed, brokerage firms have been known
to pressure-or strongly encourage-their representatives to provide services based not on
client needs but, instead, on the firms' financial objectives and associated compensation
incentives.174 Accordingly, the current regulation of brokerage firms, at the least, raises
observers who believe that the rule will not be repealed).
170. See Michael Wursthorn, New Retirement Rule Is Delayed, but Not Its Impact, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-retirement-rule-is-delayed-but-not-its-impact-1491652800
(reporting that various financial firms will proceed with new business practices designed to comply with the
fiduciary rule, regardless of whether the rule is repealed); Trump to Direct DOL to Delay Fiduciary Rule: Sources,
THINKADVISOR (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/201 7/01/3 1/trump-to-direct-dol-to-delay-
fiduciary-rule-source (noting that brokerage firms have "changed their brokerage operations in preparation for
the [fiduciary] rule" and that "with it or without [the rule,] . . . commission-based business models are on their
way out"); Zeke Faux, Trump's Fiduciary Rule Order Seen Unlikely to Stop Fee Shift, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb.
3, 2017, 5:20 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 17-02-03/trump-s-fiduciary-rule-order-seen-
unlikely-to-stop-fee-shift (reporting that President Trump's initiatives to repeal the "fiduciary rule" are "unlikely
to derail the . .. changes already under way in response" to the rule).
171. See, e.g., Investment Company Factbook, supra note 23, at 121 (noting that, in 2014, 82% ofhouseholds
that had invested in mutual funds did so through employer-sponsored retirement plans, "with 43 percent owning
funds only [through] such plans").
172. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (explaining why plan sponsors avoid engaging financial
advisers for plan participants).
173. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Does Your Broker Love You?, SLATE (Jan. 24, 2011,
7:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/thecustomer/201 1/01/does.your -broker love-you.html
(reporting several reasons why "your broker [may not] want to put you into the best available investments");
Daniel Solin, Report Says Ads Show Illusion of Fiduciary Duty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 27, 2015, 9:49
AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-investor/2015/03/27/report-says-ads-
show-illusion-of-fiduciary-duty (reporting that not only do brokers have no fiduciary obligations to their
customers, but they also "mislead them about the nature of [their] legal commitment to them.").
174. See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, J. P. Morgan to Pay $307 Million Over Client "Steering," WALL. ST. J.
(Dec. 18, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-to-pay-367-million-over-client-steering-
1450457616 (reporting on the SEC's agreement with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. to settle charges based on J.P.
Morgan's failure "to tell wealth management customers it preferred to invest their money in its own mutual funds
and hedge funds"); Michael Wursthorn, Morgan Stanley Tweaks Brokers'Pay Plan for 2016, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
20, 2015, 2:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/morgan-stanley-tweaks-brokers-pay-plan-for-2016-
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questions about whether that regulation sufficiently ensures that the advice brokerage firms
provide to retail investors does, in fact, serve investors' interests.
2. The Retirement Plan Channel
The retirement plan channel is the distribution mechanism by which retail investors
buy shares of mutual funds through their retirement plans.1 75 Like the advice channel, it is
a primary distribution mechanism for retail investors and, indeed, is the largest in terms of
the number of investors relying on it.176 At first blush, moreover, it may seem that this
channel is the most suitable distribution channel for retail investors, given the extensive
regulation and oversight to which it and its constituencies are subject. Not only are the
funds offered through the channel, like all mutual funds, heavily regulated under the
securities laws,177 but the plans themselves and the employers sponsoring them ("plan.
sponsors") also are substantially regulated under the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").17 1
In fact, however, the retirement plan channel may be the least effective of the
distribution channels. For one thing, the overwhelming majority of today's retirement plans
are "self-directed" plans, meaning that their participants must select the mutual funds in
which their assets will be invested. 179 Although there may be various reasons why
participant choice is desirable, choice has the effect, for regulatory purposes, of
1448047964 (observing that Morgan Stanley "is offering to pay between $5,000 to $50,000 to [advisory
employees] who get their clients to have an average daily cash balance of $50,000 or $5,000 a month in direct
deposits with Morgan Stanley"). Despite these concerns, some observers have noted that brokerage firms are
subject to a number of requirements in connection with providing investment advice that serve to protect clients
generally to the same degree as a formal fiduciary duty would. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker
Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 710, 713 (2010)
("[Tjhe current approach to broker-dealer obligations is appropriate and provides an adequate basis for vigorous
enforcement of broker-dealer obligations notwithstanding some apparent enforcement lapses in a few celebrated
cases.").
175. See Reid & Rea, supra note 153, at 2 ("The retirement plan channel primarily consists of employer-
sponsored defined contribution plans in which employers provide mutual funds and other investments for
purchase by plan participants .... ).
176. See EY, supra note 153, at 7 (observing that, as of 2014, the retirement plan channel was "the largest
channel" and that "72% of American households own[ed] funds distributed through employer-sponsored
retirement plans"); Reid & Rea, supra note 153, at 3 (observing that, in a "household survey of mutual fund
owners conducted in 2001," 48% of respondents "indicated that the retirement plan channel was their primary
source of mutual fund purchases").
177. Mutual funds are regulated primarily by the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64
(2012), and the rules that the SEC adopted under that statute, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-1-270.60a-1 (2016). For their
part, investment advisers are primarily regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-
1-80b-21 (2012), and the associated SEC rules, 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.0-2-275.222-2 (2016).
178. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012). ERISA requires, among
other things, that retirement plan fiduciaries act solely in the interests of plan participants and in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the relevant plan. See Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP'T. OF LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/meeting-
your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (describing the obligations of plan fiduciaries).
179. See Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51
Hous. L. REv. 153, 156 (2013) ("The average American employee saving for retirement does so through
investments pooled in an individual account found in self-directed defined contribution plans, like the
401(k) . . . .").
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curtailing-if not virtually eliminating-the fiduciary obligations to which relevant plan
sponsors would otherwise be subject. 180 That result derives from the notion that, if a plan
sponsor does not make investment decisions on behalf ofplan participants, then the sponsor
cannot be deemed responsible for the choices that any particular participant makes. 181
Accordingly, by deciding that plan participants must fend for themselves in choosing
investment options, a plan sponsor also decides that participants will bear the risks of
making the wrong choices.1 82
In addition, investing through retirement plans typically does not involve advice from
any financial professional,183 given that an employer that provides plan participants access
to investment advice becomes subject to "co-fiduciary" liability for the professional's
fiduciary duty breaches. 184 This result is reinforced by other rules that prohibit certain types
of transactions between a retirement plan and a fiduciary to the plan-which, under ERISA,
the professional would be-including the fiduciary's receipt of compensation from a
mutual fund in which assets of the plan have been invested. Under these rules, for
example, an adviser could not receive compensation from a mutual fund in connection with
providing other types of services to plan participants, even if the compensation were
objectively reasonable and even if the services were in the participants' best interests.1 86
Thus, while the prospect of co-fiduciary liability incentivizes plan sponsors not to procure
investment advice for participants, the "prohibited transaction" rules incentivize potential
advisers to avoid being so procured.
Of course, as discussed above, any such advice may or may not be meaningful.1 87
However, in the absence of any investment advice, unless a participant has independently
180. See id at 194 ("[I]n self-directed accounts where participants make investment choices, the 'choice'
creates a safe harbor presumption for the employer and other fiduciaries shielding them against liability") (citing
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006)).
181. See Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming
ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 33 (2000) (noting that if a participant in a self-directed retirement plan
"fails to diversify his account and invests all the account assets in a single stock, the employer will not be liable
for any resulting investment losses").
182. See Tucker, supra note 179, at 154 ("Under self-directed defined contribution plans, but not defined
benefit plans, [investors] bear the risks of poor market performance, longevity, and information asymmetries, as
well as plan administrative costs and life-long responsibility of asset management."). Despite the loss of fiduciary
protection that accompanies investment choice, plan sponsors must nonetheless act in participants' best interests
in selecting the funds comprising the menu from which participants make their choices. See Retail Alternatives
Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 13 ("[S]ponsors must act in the best interests of their workers as they assess the
suitability and costs of plan options . . . .").
183. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(c)(4) (2016) ("A fiduciary has no obligation under part 4 of title I of
[ERISA] to provide investment advice to a participant or beneficiary under an ERISA section 404(c) plan.");
Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 323, 338
(2007) (observing that "many employers" decline to "provide investment educational materials to 401(k) plan
participants").
184. 29 U.S.C. § I105(a) (2012) (providing that, in certain circumstances, "a fiduciary with respect to a plan
shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan"); see
Medill, supra note 181, at 48 ("From the employer's perspective, having a service provider render investment
advice to plan participants subjects the employer to potential co-fiduciary liability.").
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2012) (prohibiting certain transactions between a retirement plan and a fiduciary
to the plan).
186. See Medill, supra note 181, at 43-46 (providing various examples of such prohibited transactions).
187. See supra notes 153-74 and accompanying text (describing why investment advice may not further
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engaged a financial expert, it is likely that her decisions will not have been guided by an
informed analysis of what investments may best further her interests. This result is
particularly disheartening given the severe limitations that plague most retail investors'
investment decision-making.188
Finally, any given retirement plan offers only a relatively small number of mutual
funds.189 Given such a limited selection, it should be expected that many plans' offerings
do not include alternative funds and that, for the few that do, alternative funds comprise
only a small percentage of the already-circumscribed range of options. Moreover, any
alternative funds that may be included on the menu almost certainly will not be ones that
are appropriate for large numbers of participants, in terms of diversification. 190 After all,
whether a proposed investment serves an investor's diversification goals depends on the
particular mix of investments that the investor's portfolio already contains.
3. The Direct and Supermarket Channels
The direct and supermarket channels are substantially less important than the advice
and retirement channels, in terms of the extent to which retail investors use them.191 The
direct channel, as its name suggests, is a distribution mechanism by which a mutual fund
sells its shares directly to investors.192 Because it involves only mutual funds and
prospective investors in an unintermediated sales process, there are no third-party
intermediaries that might advise investors about particular investments or combinations of
investments. 193 The same deficiency characterizes the supermarket channel, in which
discount brokerage firms offer investors a wide array of mutual funds through
"supermarkets" that allow investors both to research funds and to buy shares. 194 Although
investors' best interests).
188. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting, among other things, that investors may be
overconfident).
189. See Matt Bell, 8 Steps to Make the Most of Your 401(k), SOUND MIND INVESTING (June 1, 2014),
https://www.soundmindinvesting.com/articles/view/8-steps-to-make-the-most-of-your- 4 01k ("Today, the
average 401(k) plan offers 19 investment choices.").
190. Cf Kenneth G. Winans, 5 Big Mistakes Investors Make When They Diversify,
FORBES (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2015/02/05/5-big-mistakes-
investors-make-when-they-diversify/ (opining that "many investors ... misdiversify, resulting in higher
investment fees, mediocre performance and potentially more risk").
191. See EY, supra note 153, at 5 (noting that, as of 2014, "[flewer than 30% of households in the US that
owned funds over the last decade owned funds purchased through the direct market channel"); Reid & Rea, supra
note 153, at 3 (observing that, as of 2002, the direct channel accounted for approximately 12% of mutual fund
assets, while the supermarket channel accounted for approximately 5%).
192. See Reid & Rea, supra note 153, at 4 ("In the direct channel, investors buy and redeem shares directly
from the fund or, more precisely, through the fund's transfer agent.").
193. Because the costs associated with the direct channel are lower than those associated with the other
distribution channels, see Daniel Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual
Fund Industry 5 (2007), http://people.brandeis.edu/-dberg/dbjchpt.pdf (observing that "[fjunds sold through the
direct channel have relatively straightforward financial arrangements with their investors" and that "[dlirect-
channel investors generally do not pay front-end loads or back-end loads"), the direct channel arguably works
best for investors who have substantial investment experience or are able to obtain sound advice from family,
friends, or advisers.
194. See Reid & Rea, supra note 153, at 3, 6 (observing that "[iun the supermarket channel, discount brokers
offer a large number of mutual funds to investors from a broad array of fund companies" and that "supermarkets
[Vol. 43:2278
Investors'Paradox
intermediaries-namely, the brokerage firms that operate the supermarkets-stand
between the offered mutual funds and prospective investors, the intermediaries do not
provide any investment advice or recommendations that might help investors choose
among funds. 195 Given these circumstances, the direct and supermarket channels, like the
other channels, may be dismissed as possible salves for improving investors' investment
capabilities.
The discussion above highlights the ways in which mutual fund distribution channels
counter the investment goals of retail investors. By contrast, sophisticated investors fare
somewhat better in the distribution process, even though they, like retail investors, invest
in mutual funds1 96 and, like retail investors, do so through distribution channels. 197 The
distribution-related difficulties confronting retail investors are mitigated in the
sophisticated investor context by sophisticated investors' greater access to information and
investment advice, in addition to, in many cases, greater investment experience. 198 In
addition, given sophisticated investors' designation as such, these investors typically have
myriad investment options beyond buying mutual fund shares.199 Those other options,
moreover, do not present the same concerns. For example, private equity and hedge funds
generally do not rely on public distribution mechanisms but instead sell interests through
direct interaction with each prospective investor.200
provide a convenient platform through which investors can research funds, obtain fund literature, and purchase
fund shares").
195. See EY, supra note 153, at 7 (noting that, in the supermarket channel, "the product line from one
manager will be thrown into a vast ocean of thousands of different products from dozens, if not hundreds, of other
asset management firms-with no dedicated sales support").
196. Despite their ability to invest in funds and other assets in which retail investors cannot invest,
sophisticated investors nonetheless also invest in mutual funds. See, e.g., Retail Alternatives Phenomenon, supra
note 69, at 13 (noting that "institutional investors have also exhibited some interest in alternative strategies
registered under the [Investment Company] Act" and that, based on a 2013 survey, one-fourth of them planned
to "direct part of their hedge fund allocations to registered products").
197. Although sophisticated investors may purchase shares through the same distribution channels that retail
investors use; a fifth channel, called the institutional channel, is available to some sophisticated investors-
namely, those that are institutions. See Reid & Rea, supra note 153, at 7 (describing the institutional channel).
198. See Kacperczyk et al., supra note 48, at I (noting that "[s]ophisticated investors have access to better
information" than their unsophisticated counterparts); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws,
International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1876 (1997) (claiming
that "[liarger, more sophisticated investors may enjoy greater economies of scale in researching securities and
have correspondingly greater expertise" as compared with "[s]mall, individual investors").
199. In addition, sophisticated investors may be more inclined than retail investors to invest directly in
securities rather than indirectly, through mutual funds and other pooled investment entities. See supra note 48
and accompanying text.
200. This circumstance is, in part, a product of the longstanding requirement under the private placement
safe harbor. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (describing rule 506 of Regulation D under the
Securities Act). In particular, until 2013, rules 502(c) and 506 of Regulation D, together, provided that an issuer
falls within rule 506 only if its offering does not involve any "general solicitation or general advertising." 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(2) (2016). In 2013, the SEC amended rule 506 pursuant to a mandate in the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)), that it allow issuers to advertise their securities offerings publicly if the issuers
ensure that only accredited investors may purchase the offered securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2016)
(describing the conditions to be met in offerings that are not subject to the limitation on the manner of offering).
However, the extent to which private issuers are using this new marketing flexibility remains unclear.
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We might say that the process by which sophisticated investors acquire information
about prospective investments and the process by which they make their investments is a
cohesive process, structured so as to be responsive to investors. It is more or less protective,
depending on the relevant investor's knowledge and experience and the specific
information she needs to make informed decisions. Accordingly, it is very different from
the tandem, but equally defeating, disclosure and distribution processes characterizing the
world of retail investing.
In the end, retail investors' apparent attraction to alternative funds suggests only that
the distribution channels have been effective.201 It cannot suggest anything about whether
investors are using alternative funds to their advantage. Indeed, given how both traditional
mutual funds and alternative funds are marketed and sold to investors, including in their
capacities as retirement plan participants, it would be reasonable to conclude, if only
preliminarily, that alternative funds have not contributed, or have contributed only little, to
retail investors' financial well-being.202
V. OVERCOMING THE PARADOX
Alternative funds foretell the next era of investing, in which smaller investors are able
to diversify their portfolios, thereby mitigating the effects of downturns in the securities
markets. They also promise to narrow the opportunity gap between retail and sophisticated
investors. But there is a problem, as Part IV discusses. Although retail investors are
increasingly investing in alternative funds, they remain insufficiently informed about the
associated nature and risks, notwithstanding the substantial amount of regulatorily-
mandated disclosure they receive.203 Moreover, distribution procedures bring retail
investors and their capital to alternative funds without alleviating this information
deficiency. 204
Combined, these concerns produce an untenable situation, given that retail investors
are the cardinal investor constituency that the securities laws aim to protect, above
institutional investors and above high-net-worth individuals.205 This discord-between
what securities regulation should do and what it presently does-is the domain of the
regulatory agency tasked with enforcing and implementing the securities laws, namely the
201. This is supported by the fact that, in a recent survey of investors, almost two-thirds of those responding
said that they "would need to learn more before investing" in alternative funds. However, approximately "half [of
them] said [that] they would consider alternatives if recommended by their advisors." Retail Alternatives
Phenomenon, supra note 69, at 3.
202. See Attracta Mooney, Mutual Hedge Funds Shunned By Investors, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015, 12:32
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/356d21Ic-92ce-1 e5-94e6-c5413829caa5.html#axzz3uL2ym2ql (noting that
"research by the University of Alabama showed that liquid alternatives have not created any value for investors").
This contention-a criticism of mutual fund regulation and distribution procedures-is also a rebuttal of those
who would use the objective popularity of alternative funds to conclude that these funds are playing a useful and
deliberate role in retail investors' investment activities. See, e.g., Jesse Solomon, Wall Street's New Happy Hour:
Liquid Alts, CNN MONEY (July 14, 2014, 4:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/14/investing/liquid-
alternatives/ (citing one portfolio manager's opinion that "investors have flocked to [liquid alternative funds]
because they aim to guard against the ups and downs of the broader market").
203. See supra notes 128-41 and accompanying text (describing investors' inadequate knowledge about
alternative funds).
204. See supra Part IV.B (describing mutual fund distribution channels).
205. See Cartwright, supra note 149 (observing that the SEC deploys its regulatory efforts primarily for the
benefit of retail investors).
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SEC. The SEC has thus far done little to improve the plight of retail investors vis-a-vis
alternative funds, however, leaving the door open for better solutions to emerge.
Addressing these topics, Part V.A discusses the SEC's response to date to the emergence
and growth of alternative funds, while Part V.B turns to reform proposals that would better
serve investor protection objectives.
A. Regulatory Response
Alternative funds emerged in an environment in which possibly everyone-mutual
fund firms, investors, and regulators-seemed to have a particular, uniform notion of how
mutual funds should be structured and what they should do.206 Why should they not?
Although the mutual fund industry has grown over the years, it only rarely has generated
wholly new types of products. Accordingly, given the growth of alternative funds and the
types of investment and trading activities in which they engage, a reaction from the SEC
could be expected.
The SEC has indeed reacted. For one thing, SEC representatives have criticized
alternative funds on the basis that investors do not sufficiently understand the risks they
pose.207 More significantly, the agency recently proposed an amendment to its rules under
the Investment Company Act that would, if adopted, impose strict limitations on mutual
funds' exposure to derivative positions, thereby curtailing alternative funds' ability to trade
in derivatives.208 Such a rule would also, therefore, effectively require many alternative
funds to modify their investment strategies substantially.209 In addition, over the past five
years, the SEC has focused rigorously on alternative funds in its periodic examinations, in
which SEC personnel review a subject fund's books and records for any compliance-
related infractions. 210
206. In the usual description, a mutual fund pools many investors' money for the purpose of investing it in
stocks, bonds, and other securities, as though a mutual fund can do nothing more than invest in securities. See,
e.g., Mutual Fund Definition, supra note 5; Mutual Funds: Investing in Mutual Funds, CNN MONEY (Mar. 24,
2017, 4:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/pf/money-essentials-mutual-funds/ ("A mutual fund pools money from
hundreds and thousands of investors to construct a portfolio of stocks, bonds, real estate, or other securities,
according to its charter."); What is a Mutual Fund, WALL ST. J. BLOG, http://guides.wsj.com/personal-
finance/investing/what-is-a-mutual-fund/ (last visited Sept. I1, 2017) ("The underlying logic of mutual funds is
that they provide diverse investments-in stocks, bonds and cash-without requiring investors to make separate
purchases and trades.") (excerpting DAVE KANSAS, THE COMPLETE MONEY AND INVESTING GUIDEBOOK 131
(2005)). These descriptions incorrectly suggest that, under applicable regulation, a mutual fund (i) may engage
only in investing activities and therefore may not, for example, hold short positions in securities or trade
derivatives, and (ii) may invest only in securities and therefore may not invest in real estate, art, or other assets.
207. See Matthew Beaton, Galvin Targets 25 Funds in Liquid Alt Sweep, IGNITES, July 15, 2015 (on file
with the author) (quoting Kara Stein) (citing SEC Commissioner Kara Stein's statement that "liquid alternatives'
tactics are riskier than a lot of investors realize").
208. See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies,
80 Fed. Reg. 80,884 (Dec. 28, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) (summarizing the proposed rule's
requirements). The purpose of the rule is to limit the amount of leverage that a mutual fund may undertake using
derivatives. See id. (noting that the proposed rule is "designed to impose a limit on the amount of leverage the
fund may obtain through derivatives transactions and other senior securities transactions").
209. See Robert A. Wittie et al., SEC Proposes New Limits on Funds' Use ofDerivatives, K&L GATES (Dec.
29, 2015), http://www.klgates.com/sec-proposes-new-limits-on-funds-use-of-derivatives-12-29-2015/ ("The
SEC recognized in its Proposing Release that compliance with [the new rule] would require some funds to
significantly alter their investment strategies . . . .").
210. See Compliance Alert, SEC (June 2007),
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Finally, and most importantly, the agency has seemingly targeted alternative fund
groups in its enforcement actions against mutual funds and their managers. In a 2012
enforcement action, for example, it alleged that the board of directors of a group of
alternative funds had failed to specify policies governing the "fair valuation" of securities
in the funds' portfolios that could not be readily valued through market prices.211 In another
enforcement action a year later, the SEC charged the board of a series trust with failing to
ensure that information contained in the funds' periodic reports to shareholders accurately
reflected certain decisions that the board had made, as detailed in the minutes of the
relevant board meetings.212 In a third action, brought in 2015, the agency charged the board
of another series trust with failing to ensure that all of the board's questions about a
prospective new manager for the trust had been fully answered before the board approved
the manager.213
These recent enforcement actions, and others, should cause concern, not because of
the infractions noted, the claims made, or the punishment sought but, rather, because the
SEC's posture in each of them is unrelated to one of the primary concerns that animates
corporate law and that is usually a regulatory focal point. In particular, the SEC's typical
worry is that a board of directors will act in its own interests rather than in the interests of
the corporation that it oversees and that entity's shareholders. 214
In the mutual fund context, a similar worry is that a fund manager, being an enterprise
that is separate from, and independent of, each of the funds that it manages, will have undue
influence on the funds' board, given the manager's controlling role as to the funds.215 The
"control" factor is especially pronounced to the extent that the manager effectively hand-
picked the directors, as is generally the case with the manager-centered structure described
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/complialert.htm#P 10_20085 ("The SEC staffconducts compliance
examinations of SEC-registered ... investment companies ... to determine whether these firms are in
compliance with the federal securities laws and rules, and to identify deficiencies and weaknesses in compliance
and supervisory controls.").
211. See J. Kenneth Alderman et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 30300, 2012 WL6100223 (Dec.
10, 2012), at *2 (cease-and-desist order) (alleging that the board had not "specified] a fair valuation methodology
pursuant to which the securities were to be fair valued"). Additionally, the SEC claimed that the board had no
procedure for reviewing the value of fair-valued securities whose prices had not been adjusted for substantial
periods. See id. at *4 (alleging that "the Valuation Procedure did not include any mechanism for identifying and
reviewing fair-valued securities whose prices remained unchanged for weeks, months and even entire quarters").
212. See Northern Lights Compliance Services, LLC, et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 30502,
2013 WL 1835420 (May 2, 2013), at *2 (cease-and-desist order) (alleging that "on certain occasions...
disclosures included in shareholder reports . . . contained boilerplate disclosures that were materially untrue or
misleading in violation of . .. the Investment Company Act").
213. See Commonwealth Capital Management, LLC, et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 31678,
2015 WL 3760794 (June 17, 2015), at *2 (cease-and-desist order) (alleging that the board had approved advisory
contracts between the funds and the manager even though the manager had not provided all of the information
that the board had requested).
214. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate
Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 360 (2001) (noting that "[t]he central problem of corporate law, and
especially corporate governance, is to reduce . . . agency costs," which are the costs arising from directors'
"shirking (laziness, playing excessive amounts of golf) or opportunistic (self-serving, self-dealing) behavior").
215. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of
Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 615, 617-18 (2001) (observing that a mutual fund's manager "typically controls all
facets of fund life" and that the manager's "de facto control over the fund's board" creates conflicts "lead[ing] to
the risk that well-understood obligations owed by board members may not be fulfilled").
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in Part 11.216 In those circumstances, the board may have compelling conflicts of interest,
in that it may be inclined to act in accordance with the manager's wishes, even when doing
so might counter the best interests of the funds and their investors-that is, the persons to
whom the board owes its fiduciary duties.217
That problem is no more acute or intractable for alternative funds than it is for
traditional mutual funds. Moreover, the funds about which the SEC seems to have the
greatest concern, those within series trusts, do not raise these governance concerns to the
same extent as funds in manager-centered structures. In the series trust context, the role of
the manager (or, more accurately, the managers) is muted, given that each manager is only
one of many within the larger group, and no manager has responsibility for selecting the
directors-a role that typically belongs to the trust's sponsor, which, in the case of series
trusts, is usually the administrator.218 Just as important, unlike in a manager-centered
structure, which involves only one manager and therefore usually exists only as long as the
manager continues to manage the funds' assets, a series trust is not dependent on the
continued involvement of any of its many managers.
These differences between manager-dominated structures and series trusts means that
boards of the latter, unlike boards of the former, have little or no incentive to accede to a
manager's wishes, whether in assigning a price to hard-to-value securities (a process in
which the manager may have an incentive to recommend inappropriately high prices), in
determining what to include in disclosure to investors, or in approving managers for
admission to the trust. The SEC, in its concerted focus on alternative funds' non-traditional
investment strategies and the more limited track records of many of the managers
spearheading them, does not seem to have recognized these distinctions. That it has not,
however, leaves wide scope for creative thinking about how regulation should address
alternative funds-how it should, in other words, overcome the limitations of investor
knowledge and decision-making wherewithal detailed in Part IV. Doing so is critical, not
only for the sake of allowing retail investors to achieve greater diversification, but also to
steer securities regulation back to the track of furthering the goals for which it exists.
B. A New Direction
For those goals to be achieved, investors need more than the skeptical eye of
regulators. Rather, the primary challenge for policymakers-whether Congress or
executive agencies-is to improve investors' abilities to make sound investment decisions.
Undoubtedly, the ideal way to accomplish this would be to start from scratch, in terms of
the laws and rules that govern the way that investment advice is dispensed. A
thoroughgoing reconfiguration of advisory services might, for example, dismantle the
regulatory walls that separate brokerage firms from investment advisers and that prevent
either from being flexible in defining their business objectives or creative in delivering
their services.
216. See id. (noting that the manager's control typically extends "from the fund's incorporation through the
selection of the initial board").
217. See Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument: The Limitations ofthe Corporate Governance
Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 283 (2013) (observing that, due to the usual relationship between
a mutual fund's directors and its manager, the directors "may be deemed interested in transactions the [manager]
proposes" and, therefore "may not act as strong fiduciaries" in various matters).
218. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text (describing the usual structure of series trusts).
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However, achieving results within a reasonable timeframe, particularly in the current
political climate, counsels in favor of focusing on what is politically feasible. Toward that
end, it may seem that improving disclosure is the best solution-even if disclosure is very
often ineffective-given regulation's longstanding and profound reliance on it as a tool for
protecting investors. This is particularly so to the extent one believes that any other
approach would be politically unworkable.
The topic of improving disclosure is recurring and well-worn, with the SEC repeatedly
revising (or proposing to revise) the types of disclosures required of regulated financial
institutions219 and Congress proposing revisions of its own.220 Each of these adjustments
and proposals is insufficient, however.221 Moreover, their inadequacies share a common
trait: by merely supplementing or augmenting disclosure or changing the way it is delivered
or consumed, they remain lodged in a world where disclosure reforms will always "add"
to investors' decision-making abilities because investors will instinctively know what to
make of them.222 Yet, as many commentators have pointed out, this policymaking
construct is far from realistic,223 which, in turn, means that changing the content or
219. Among other things, the agency has proposed a new rule that, if adopted, would require mutual funds,
on a monthly basis, to report their portfolio holdings to the agency, replacing the current quarterly reporting
requirement. See Investment Company Reporting Modernization; Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,590-01 (June
12, 2015) (proposing a rule that "would require certain registered investment companies to report information
about their monthly portfolio holdings to the [SEC]"). In addition, it has required that mutual funds and other
issuers draft disclosures using "plain English" rather than legal or regulatory jargon, thereby bolstering investors'
ability to understand the disclosed information. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6,370 (Feb. 6, 1998)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239 & 274) (announcing rule requiring issuers to write certain
components of their prospectuses in plain English). It has also adopted requirements that firms provide various
types of information in interactive data format so that investors may download the information into spreadsheets
and more readily analyze it. See, e.g., Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,776-01
(Feb. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, and elsewhere) (requiring firms to provide "financial
statement information" in interactive data format).
220. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly authorized the SEC to implement procedures to test the
efficacy of particular types of disclosure before adopting them for industry use. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 912, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2010)) (authorizing the SEC to "engage in such temporary investor testing programs as the
[SEC] determines are in the public interest or would protect investors").
221. Periodic reports containing details of portfolio holdings cannot alleviate the problems if investors do
not know how to use the information provided. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing how
investors may be unable to use available information to their benefit). Plain English disclosure cannot achieve its
objective of straightforward, understandable communication if the message it is tasked with conveying remains
obscure to average readers. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting that investors may not appreciate
factors relevant to investment decisions). Pre-testing investors' comprehension of disclosure, while possibly
improving investors' understanding of the risks associated with the particular service or product at issue, may
nevertheless do little to assist them in understanding the role of the service or product in allocating their portfolio
assets among services and products. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (observing that the ample
disclosure provided to investors about any particular product does not help them to make sound portfolio
allocation decisions). Finally, giving investors the ability to interact with disclosure so as to better compare the
same type of information across funds does not affect the categories of information available to them or their
ability to use information or to understand its significance.
222. See Ripken, supra note 131, at 146 ("The emphasis in securities law on providing information to the
public is premised on the belief that individuals are rational, self-governing actors who are willing and able to
process the information wisely.").
223. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why disclosure is often ineffective).
[Vol. 43:2284
Investors' Paradox
manipulability of disclosure is not the answer. Importantly, there is another way for
investors to become better informed.
1. Reforming Distribution
Reform should focus not on disclosure requirements but, instead, on the mutual fund
distribution process. More specifically, the profit-focused fund distribution machine should
be transformed into an investor-centered one. Toward that end, any investment advice
provided in the mutual fund distribution process should be given in furtherance of
investors' best interests. In other words, it should be fiduciary advice. In addition, "advice"
in this context should have a special meaning, in that financial advisers should be obligated
to advise an investor not only about the appropriateness of any particular mutual fund
investment, but also regarding whether that investment might (or might not) contribute to
appropriate diversification of the investor's overall investment portfolio.
This proposal is consonant with changes that are already occurring in the financial
industry. As Part IV notes, the Department of Labor recently adopted a new rule that
imposes fiduciary obligations on brokerage firms and their representatives.224 Under the
rule, brokerage firms that sell mutual fund shares and other products to investors using
retirement plan or IRA assets are required to ensure that any particular recommendation is
in the investors' best interests. 225
The effect of this rule is limited, however. Although the assets that most retail investors
deploy in the capital markets are retirement assets,226 brokerage firms typically provide
advice only as to certain types of retirement assets-those held in IRAs.227 That is the
inevitable product of the fact that retirement plan participants usually do not have the
benefit of investment advice as they make investment decisions, given that plan sponsors
would have co-fiduciary liability for any fiduciary duty breaches committed by the person
providing that advice.228 Moreover, because the amount of retirement plan assets that
investors hold in mutual funds at least equals (and likely outweighs) the amount of IRA
assets they hold in mutual funds, 229 this exclusion is more than de minimis.
Accordingly, in addition to ensuring that all investment-related advice is fiduciary
advice, policymakers should modify the regulation that is designed to protect retirement
plan participants-namely, ERISA and rules adopted by the Department of Labor under
ERISA. Given the scope and complexity of this regulatory regime, considerable
consideration and analysis will be necessary to develop a specific blueprint for doing so.
However, a couple of critical reforms come to mind.
224. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text (describing the new rule).
225. See id. (describing the new rule).
226. See Investment Company Factbook, supra note 23, at 121 (observing that, in 2014, the overwhelming
majority of households with mutual fund investments had invested through retirement plans).
227. This is simply a product of the fact that participants in retirement plans typically do not have the benefit
of advice as they invest through those plans. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. Accordingly, to the
extent that brokerage firms provide any advice regarding the investment of retirement assets, those assets will be
held in IRA accounts.
228. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (observing that plan sponsors typically do not engage
an adviser to assist plan participants with their investment decisions).
229. See Investment Company Factbook, supra note 23, at 124 (showing that, as of the end of 2014,
retirement plan assets invested in mutual funds exceeded IRA assets so invested).
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First, policymakers should eliminate the possibility of heightened, co-fiduciary
liability for plan sponsors that arrange for plan participants to have the benefit of
investment advice as they select account investments.230 This change would likely
encourage more plan sponsors to embrace advisory arrangements for the benefit of plan
participants. Second, those who might provide investment advice to plan participants
should be exempted from some of the onerous prohibited-transaction rules under ERISA
that presently incentivize them to eschew advisory roles vis-it-vis plan participants.231
These rules, which seem only tangentially related to protecting plan participants, have
served as an additional deterrent to the provision of investment advice to those investors.
But these proposals are not enough. Providing advice intended to further an investor's
best interests does little good if the adviser does not herself have adequate expertise in the
subject of her advice. To the contrary, fiduciary obligations may be expected to benefit
investors only to the extent that the person who is subject to them has a thorough
understanding of both portfolio diversification principles and the wide range of investment
products available to retail investors. Only with expertise in both of these arenas can an
adviser help an investor build a robust portfolio of diverse investments with a reasonable
level of risk.
Ensuring that advisers have this expertise need not involve wide-scale reform. For
example, one approach might be for policymakers to broaden the use of a tool already used
throughout the securities industry-namely, the competency exam. Many representatives
of investment advisory firms-those registered with state regulatory authorities,
primarily-and all brokerage firm representatives presently must pass one or more exams
in order to act on behalf of their firms.232 Those exams have been effective in ensuring that
financial professionals have basic knowledge about the products they offer and general
awareness of applicable law.233 However, they presently do not cover the full range of
tasks that these professionals now perform, including advising retail investors about
alternative funds and portfolio allocation.234 Expanding the scope of competency testing
could be an effective way to ensure that brokerage firm representatives and other advisers
are knowledgeable to the full extent of their professional roles.
230. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (describing co-fiduciary liability for plan sponsors).
231. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (describing certain prohibited-transaction rules to
which advisers to plan participants become subject by virtue of assuming an advisory role).
232. See Peter Cherewyk, Introduction to the Series 65 Exam, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/professionaleducation/11/intro-series-65-exam.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2017) ("Most state securities regulators have set the Series 65 [exam] as the minimum requirement to become an
investment advisor representative."); 1032.(a)(1) Categories of Representation Registration, FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-imain.html?rbid=2403&element id=3585 (last visited Nov. 2,
2017) (providing that brokerage firm representatives must "register with [FINRA] as a General Securities
Representative and [must] pass an appropriate Qualification Examination before such registration may become
effective").
233. See Michael Kitces, Are the Licensing and Other Requirements to Become a Financial Advisor Too
Easy?, KITCES.COM (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:01 AM), https://www.kitces.com/blog/are-the-licensing-and-other-
requirements-to-become-a-financial-advisor-too-easy/ ("[T]he licensing exams for financial advisors do little
more than test basic product knowledge and awareness of the applicable state and Federal laws . . . .").
234. See, e.g., id. (observing that none of the licensing exams for financial professionals "require[s] any
substantive education in financial planning").
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2. Possible Challenges
It is a simple matter to say that intermediaries that sell mutual fund shares should have
broad ranging fiduciary duties and be well versed in the matters that pertain most directly
to sound portfolio construction. One might argue, however, that these solutions are only
surface deep and do not speak to the ways in which mutual fund distribution channels may
need to evolve to accommodate such broad-scale fiduciary requirements.
Indeed, some commentators have suggested with respect to the Department of Labor's
new fiduciary rule that subjecting brokerage firms and their representatives to fiduciary
obligations may upend the brokerage business model-a business model dependent on
commissions earned on firms' successful distributions of particular securities.235 As a
result, brokerage firms may ultimately cease to provide investment advice or may continue
to do so but at fee rates that are prohibitive for many investors. Along these lines, some
observers believe that the brokerage industry will become "advice-centric" and that
brokerage firms will look and act much like registered investment advisers. 236
Ultimately, how bestowing fiduciary status on brokerage firms will affect the firms'
ability or desire to maintain a semblance of their current business structures remains to be
seen.237 It is to be hoped that, in the reconfigured world, steady investor demand for
capable and affordably priced investment advice will fuel the development of new business
models that are workable for all constituencies. In that regard, there is cause for optimism.
If this Article has made no other point, it has at least shown that demand for new types of
financial products and services does not go unheeded.
Another potential concern is that the proposed reforms will not affect those distribution
channels, such as the direct and supermarket channels, that do not involve investment
advice at all.238 Accordingly, investors that invest in mutual funds through those channels
will continue to face, unaided, the risks that accompany the investment and diversification
processes. This is particularly the case to the extent that alternative funds are involved, as
they should be.
The direct response to this concern is that it may indeed be feasible to incorporate an
advice component-perhaps an optional one 239-into the channels that presently offer
none, and policymakers should consider that approach. The more fundamental response to
this concern, however, is that it misses the point. The driving thrust of improving investor
decision-making should not be immediately to achieve a gold standard of investment
235. See Michael Kitces, Reinventing the Broker-Dealer Business Model to Survive A DoL Fiduciary Future,
KITCES.COM (Feb. 15, 2016, 7:01 AM), https://www.kitces.com/blog/reinventing-the-broker-dealer-business-
model-to-survive-a-department-of-labor-fiduciary-future (observing that, in the traditional business model,
brokerage firms are "securities product salespeople").
236. See id. ("[Ilf forced to do so, brokers-as-financial-advisors can finally ... become true financial
advisors who get paid for advice instead of product distribution.").
237. Any fiduciary rule that applies beyond the retirement context would be the province of the SEC, rather
than the Department of Labor. Although the specific requirements of such a rule are beyond the scope of this
Article, such a rule should improve upon the Department of Labor's rule by achieving a better balance between,
on the one hand, the need for brokers to continue performing their historical role in the financial markets and, on
the other, the needs of investors for unconflicted investment assistance.
238. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text (describing the direct and supermarket channels).
239. Whichever channels ultimately serve as sources of advice, it will remain desirable to allow those
investors who are not in need of advice to buy fund shares directly or through mutual fund supermarkets, without
first having to receive an adviser's recommendations.
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advice whereby all investors are able to obtain the best or most thorough advice that may
be had about an investment or their portfolio composition. Rather it should be to begin
helping large segments of investors make investment and diversification decisions based
on more information and expertise than what they would have in the absence of such
assistance and also based on more information than what they would glean from attempting
to parse lengthy and ponderous disclosure documents.
In other words, ensuring that investors have access to competent and truthful advice
and information that they understand is an improvement on the current state of affairs, in
which investments in mutual funds often seem based on the landing points of darts pelted
at a bullseye. Presently, and notwithstanding the emergence of alternative funds, investors'
portfolios contain inappropriate investments within inappropriate combinations of
investments, which do little to serve investors' interests or those of the capital markets.
Fiduciary requirements and improved competency among advisers would not necessarily
be protective of all investors, all of the time, but, on the "protection" scale, they would be
a substantial step up from nothing.
VI. CONCLUSION
That sophisticated investors are better equipped to use disclosure to profitable effect
than are retail investors and have greater access to investment advice than do retail
investors highlights what is perhaps the most formidable difficulty with the emergence of
alternative funds: in terms of portfolio diversification, alternative funds may mark the
beginning of a new era of investment opportunity and performance for retail investors. Yet,
in terms of the important securities regulatory goal of investor protection, the world
remains frustratingly risk-laden.
The regulatory task, however, should not be to excessively challenge alternative
funds as being too risky for retail investors but should instead be to develop ways of
helping retail investors both understand the relevant risks and make better investment
decisions. Of course, better decisions in this context cannot mean decisions that
ultimately prove profitable (such is not within regulators' capabilities). Rather, it means
decisions based on an actual understanding of an investment's possible risks and
anticipated rewards and the diversification function that the investment might serve in the
investor's overall portfolio. Much is occurring, and has occurred, in the financial industry
that rightly causes worry. Increasing investment opportunities for investors that, for so
long, have been excluded from so many of them-and doing so in a prudent and
thoughtful manner-should not be among them.
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